http://www.tearsofoberon.blogspot.com/2012/09/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html
I. PLAINTIFF INFORMATION
Plaintiff: Vikky Boer
Born: 1970
Family: all Witnesses
Siblings: 3
Home Town: Shelburne, Ontario
II. CASE OVERVIEW & CAUSE OF ACTION
The plaintiff Victoria Boer seeks punitive damages and damages for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Canada (the governing body of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada) and three elders of that church. Her claim stems from actions taken by the Jehovah’s Witnesses elders when, at the age of 19, she disclosed to them that she had been sexually molested by her father during her childhood. The plaintiff alleges that she was forced to confront her father with these allegations in the presence of two male elders of her congregation, an experience which she found to be traumatic. She said she was then required to go through essentially the same exercise of confrontation again, this time before three male elders, as part of a church disciplinary process against her father, thereby compounding the trauma. She further alleges that Watchtower failed to properly deal with the abuse by her father, failed to report it as required by law, and directed her not to seek medical and psychological treatment. The plaintiff testified that as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing she has suffered extreme emotional harm which was for years untreated and which will require extensive therapy in the future.
III. TIMELINE
1970: born
1981-1985 (age 11-15 approx.): molested by father
1985 (age 15): abuse stops, and serious discussion of the molestation first begin within the family itself
1989 (age 19): leaves home to take job in Toronto
Fall 1989: emotional problems surface, confides in friend (Chris), friend advises her to seek out an elder (Sheldon Longworth)
December 11, 1989: Vicky first contacts Sheldon Longworth.
December 12-16, 1989: various back and forths between Mr. Longworth, WTS head office and Vicky Boer.
December 17: Vicky calls mother, mother advices her to go to Shelbourne elders.
December 18: last meeting between Vicky and Mr. Longworth
Between December 13 and 28: 1989: discussions with Jonathan Mott-Trille begin, lead to discussions with Frank Mott-Trille.
December 29, 1989: first meeting arranged between Vicky, parents and two elders (Steve Brown and Brian Cairns). Elders did not know nature of meeting until after arriving.
Late Janurary 1990: judicial committee formed, second meeting arranged with the same people in additiont to elder Dave Walker.
Early 1990 to July 1991 (age 20-21): moves back in with parents after difficulties with job
July 1991: Vicky moves to Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan
1992 (age 22): Vicky and Scott Boer married
1995 or 1996 (age 25-26): Vicky Boer leaves the Jehovah's Witness faith
Early 1998 (age 28): Vicky's mother dies
August 25, 1998: court action commenced
IV. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL FINDINGS
- Mr. Longworth told Ms. Boer on more than one occasion that Matthew 18 applied and that she should speak directly to her father about her abuse.
- This advice was an inaccurate application of the Scripture.
- Ms. Boer was extremely upset at the prospect of having to confront her father. Her level of distress was accurately described by her and Jonathan Motte-Trille. Although Mr. Longworth knew she was upset, and indeed crying much of the time, he did not perceive her distress to be as acute as that described by Mr. Motte-Trille.
- Ms. Boer was given correct advice by Mr. Motte-Trille that Matthew 18 did not apply.
- Thereafter she spoke to Mr. Longworth and told him that she might speak to her mother rather than her father. Mr. Longworth did no press the point. She then actually spoke to her mother and asked her mother to direct her father to contact the elders.
- Up to December 29, 1989, although there had been discussion about the requirement of invoking Matthew 18, it was not actually applied and Ms. Boer did not have any direct confrontation with her father.
- Sheldon Longworth instructed the plaintiff that she was required to confront her father pursuant to Matthew 18:15 - 18. Initially she was instructed to tell her father to report his sin to the elders in Shelburne. The plaintiff did not actually do this. Instead with the acquiescence of Mr. Longworth, she asked her mother to tell her father to report the matter to the Shelburne elders.
- The December 29, 1989 meeting was set up by Mr. Palmer and it was he who invited the plaintiff to attend.
- Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown did not know what the meeting was about and had no part in compelling the plaintiff to attend. The process which led to the plaintiff’s attendance at the December 29, 1987 meeting was put in place as a result of advice given by Sheldon Longworth and Watch Tower that Matthew 18 applied.
- But for this advice, Ms. Boer would not have attended. The meeting was psychologically harmful to her
The defendants did not instruct the plaintiff not to get medical help. She chose not to seek professional help herself against the advice of the elders and Mr. Mott-Trille. - The defendants did not instruct the plaintiff that her father’s abuse should not be reported. On the contrary, the defendants directed Mr. Palmer to report himself to the C.A.S. and then followed up directly to ensure he had done so.
- The January 31, 1990 meeting was a Judicial Committee called to decide the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon Mr. Palmer as a result of his sin. It was not an application of Matthew 18. There was no confrontation between the plaintiff and her father.
V. SIGNIFICANT OR INTERESTING PASSAGES
[24] The defendants deny telling the plaintiff not to report to C.A.S. and deny telling her not to get medical help. On the contrary, they say they advised the plaintiff to get medical help and understood she would be seeing a psychiatrist recommended by Frank Mott-Trille. Further, they required Mr. Palmer to report the abuse to his family doctor and to the C.A.S. and followed up with C.A.S. to ensure this was done. The defendants deny having covered up the abuse, although they did try to maintain confidentiality for the protection of the plaintiff and other members of her family.
[27] The first witness, Professor James Penton, is an historian and the author of a book entitled Apocalypse Delayed. Mr. Mark, on behalf of the plaintiff, intended to elicit evidence from Mr. Penton with respect to his conclusions about various characteristics of Jehovah’s Witnesses...Professor Penton’s evidence would be based on his research and would constitute opinion. He does not have first-hand evidence.
[28] In any event, I am by no means satisfied that expert evidence of this nature would have been admissible in respect of these matters. It seems to me that I am in a position to determine the relevant facts to the particular matters before me without the assistance of an expert on these matters.
[29] The second witness proposed by the plaintiff is Barbara Anderson, who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in New York from 1954 until her recent disfellowshipping (ejection from the faith). The plaintiff proposed to elicit evidence from Ms. Anderson as to her knowledge of how sexual abuse of children is dealt with within that religion and of cover-ups of abuse within that society. Most of Ms. Anderson’s proposed testimony would be hearsay...
[30] The general test for the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a civil trial is derived from Mood Music Publishing Co. v DeWolf Ltd .; [1976] Ch 19, 1 ALL E.R. 763 (C.A.) In that case, Lord Denning stated, at page 127 (Ch)
…in civil cases the court will admit evidence of similar facts if it is logically probative, that is if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue; provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side; and also that the other side has fair notice of it and is able to deal with it.
[31] The proposed evidence from Ms. Anderson fails this test on every front. First, it is not logically probative of any issue before me. Whatever may have been Ms. Anderson’s personal experience with the Jehovah’s Witness faith, and whatever information she may have gleaned about how child abuse cases were dealt with elsewhere, she has no evidence whatsoever about the Toronto or Shelburne congregations or any of the individuals in this case. Further, even her information about Watch Tower generally relates to that organization in the United States. There is nothing about her evidence that would assist in the very specific findings of fact I am required to make about what happened in the case before me.
[33] Thirdly, the proposed evidence is oppressive and unfair. Even if the evidence could be seen as relevant (which it is not) it would only be so if it were true. In order to establish the truth of it, a trial within a trial would be required. There would be no effective way for the defendants to mount a defense to the matters alleged by Ms. Anderson, and the admission of such evidence would therefore be unfair to them.
[37]...However, I conclude from the evidence at trial that that she had not realized the connection between that abuse and her own psychological state until years later when she began therapy. In particular, it was not until 1995 when Ms. Boer and her husband underwent marital counseling with Susan Frickland, a social worker in Moose Jaw, that Ms. Boer substantially appreciated the connection between the childhood issue and the anxiety and behavior she was experiencing as an adult. Even then, the potential causal connection between the behavior of the church elders and the plaintiff’s emotional suffering was not apparent to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was unhappy about many aspects of her faith and how she had been treated by the elders, she did not connect that unhappiness to any problems she was having until after she attended a counseling session with Russell Scott in October 1997. She had gone to see Mr. Scott because she felt emotionally overwhelmed raising her three small children in Quebec City while her husband was away on military duties. She told him of difficulties she was having in her relationship with her parents, which led to her relating some of the problems she experienced growing up as a Jehovah’s Witness. Ms. Boer also disclosed to Mr. Scott that she had been sexually abused by her father and told him about the pressure from the elders to confront her father about this in their presence. Mr. Scott told the plaintiff that this confrontation had the potential to be emotionally damaging and also suggested that she do some research of her own on the importance of being raised in a “cult environment.”
[38] I find as a fact that it was only after this session with Mr. Scott and the follow-up research she undertook on her own through the Internet that Ms. Boer came to any understanding that the actions of the elders in 1989 and 1990 could be a source of her psychological problems...
[51]...I do not find the perceptions of Frank Mott-Trille to be as reliable. His evidence was at times exaggerated. I treat it with caution as it appeared to me to be coloured somewhat by Mr Mott-Trille’s hostility toward the elders and the Jehovah’s Witness organization. If Mr. Mott-Trille really believed Ms. Boer to be suicidal at the time she left his home after their second meeting, I would not have expected him to suggest to her that she go by herself to report the matter to C.A.S. Further, when the plaintiff failed to attend for her appointment with Dr. Kaplar, I would have expected Mr Mott-Trille to take more urgent steps to follow up if he had perceived her mental distress at the time to be as acute as he described it in his evidence at trial.
[62] In my view much of the confusion surrounding the Matthew 18 issue stems from the fact that it does not actually apply to a situation such as this one. I accept the evidence of John Didur that it is not now the policy of the Jehovah's Witness to require a victim of abuse to proceed through the steps envisioned in verse 15-18 of Matthew 18, nor was that the policy in 1989. He explained that Matthew 18 applies to private disputes between people such as disputes over financial matters, and cannot be applied to a serious sin against God's laws, such as child abuse. I understand why the defense witnesses are genuinely puzzled as to how this could have come up in this situation. However, I am confident that Matthew 18 was mentioned specifically to the plaintiff and that she was told it applied.
[67] Ms. Boer testified that at the first meeting at her parent’s home which took place on December 29, 1989 Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown warned her against reporting her father’s abuse to the Children’s Aid Society (“C.A.S.”)...According to Ms. Boer, the two elders specifically told her not to go to the C.A.S...Ms. Boer’s evidence on this point is completely at odds with all the other evidence.
[68] One of the first things Sheldon Longworth did upon hearing the plaintiff's first disclosure was to consult the 1988 Watchtower letter setting out the policy for dealing with cases of sexual abuse of children. Likewise, Brian Cairns turned to this document immediately after the December 29 meeting to determine what should be done...What is clear from the document is that the official policy of the church was to report child abuse cases to child welfare officials. Further, the policy advises that elders as ministers have a positive duty to ensure that child abuse is reported. Although the policy suggests it is permissible to require the offender or family members to report the matter to their own physician who would then have a duty to report, the policy also emphasizes the need for the elder to follow up to ensure that the reporting in fact occurred.
[71] Mr. Cairns called Mr. Didur at Watch Tower head office shortly after the December 25 meeting. Mr. Cairns testified, and I accept, that Mr. Didur said reporting was clearly required because there were still children in the home. Mr. Didur said the ideal situation would be to get the abuser to report himself, either to a doctor or the C.A.S., but that the elders had to report if Mr. Palmer failed to do so...
[73] Mr. Cairns tesified, and I accept, that when the Palmers returned from Florida, Mr. Cairns told Mr. Palmer he had to report himself to a medical doctor and Mr. Palmer agreed to do so...
[74]...Mr. Cairns therefore called Mr. Palmer and told him that he should personally report himself to the C.A.S. Mr. Palmer reported back to the elders that he had taken his wife and two youngest children with him to the Children’s Aid Society and reported the matter to them. Mr. Brown testified, and I accept, that he personally called the C.A.S. office immediately thereafter to confirm the report had been made. The plaintiff acknowledges Mr. Palmer did in fact report himself to the Children’s Aid Society.
[75] I find that Mr. Cairns, Mr Brown, and Mr. Didur were aware of the reporting requirement and fully intended to comply with it...However, it is clear there was no plan to cover up this abuse from the authorities. On the contrary, all of the elders involved were consistent in their resolve to ensure the Children’s Aid Society was made aware of these allegations. Further, it was because of the elders that the C.A.S. was in fact notified. Based on this alone, it is improbable that the elders told Ms. Boer in December 29, 1989, that she should not tell the authorities because her father could go to jail and her mother end up destitute.
[77]... What I do question is her (Vicky's) ability to recall accurately and specifically who said what at a meeting thirteen years ago-- a meeting which, by her own account, was highly emotional and traumatic for her...Her own evidence, which is corroborated to some extent by notes of others at around that time, is that her parents were angry with her for having brought this matter up again. If there was pressure on Ms. Boer to “bury” the issue and to avoid reporting to the authorities, it most likely came from her mother. Given Mrs. Palmers’ devotion to her religion, it is entirely possible that she cast this as a religious duty and that over the years Vicki Boer has come to believe it emanated from the elders. However, her recollection is mistaken. I find as a fact there was so suggestion from Mr. Bown or Mr. Cairns that the matter should be covered up or that it should not be reported to the authorities.
[78] He [Frank Mott-Trille] did not have first-hand knowledge of the communications between Watch Tower head office and the elders who were directly involved in dealing with the matter. I conclude that his outrage was more directed towards how the issue was handled from a religious point of view... If his concern was truly that there was a cover-up or failure to report to child welfare authorities, he had an obvious remedy. He was the first elder of the Shelburne congregation to become aware of the abuse and as a result of the report directly to him in mid-December by Ms. Boer. However, he took no steps himself to bring the matter to the attention of the authorities at that time.
[80] Brian Cairns testified at trial that he never instructed Ms. Boer not to get medical help. On the contrary he suggested it would be a good idea. Mr. Brown supported Mr. Cairns’ evidence. He testified that Ms. Boer was told it was a matter of personal choice whether she sought psychiatric help and was never discouraged from doing so. I accept their evidence.
[82]..."The daughter was quite upset while trying to tell us about it. She expressed that she felt much better emotionally now that we had heard her out. The elders gave encouragement to her and suggested that in addition to getting spiritual refreshment she may want to get medical assistance if she felt it was necessary. That would be her decision and we would not push that."
[84] In his January 29, 1990 letter Mr. Cairns asked Watch Tower for guidance on a number of questions including whether it was necessary for the elders to insist that “both parties” receive psychiatric help. Watch Tower responded that following the handling of a case both the accuser and accused might need the assistance of a physician or psychologist for mental and emotional recovery and that this should be recommended. The letter then states that the elders can “only recommend” and that the kind and extent of professional help sought is a matter of personal decision.
[86] I find that the defendants did not impede Ms. Boer from getting psychological counseling, but rather that they encouraged it. She received the same encouragement from Mr. Mott-Trille. She elected, as was her right, not to act on that advice. It was years later that she finally decided to seek treatment and initially that was for problems which she did not immediately connect to the sexual abuse. The delay in obtaining treatment is in no way attributable to the defendants.
[103]... The abuse was reported to the Children’s Aid Society in Orangeville (the office with authority extending to Shelburne) in February 1990. It would appear that representatives of the C.A.S. interviewed the plaintiff’s younger sister (who was still a child) to ensure she had not been a victim and was in no danger. The authorities were satisfied that no further steps needed to be taken. They did not even speak to the plaintiff. Therefore there cannot have been any damages to the plaintiff as a result of the delay in reporting between December 29, 1989 and February 5, 1990.
[106]...In the case before me, I intend to approach from the other direction. I consider first the following question: assuming there is a fiduciary duty, can the conduct of any of the defendants be properly characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty? In my view, it cannot. This conclusion is fatal to the cause of action. It is therefore unnecessary for me to decide whether there was a fiduciary responsibility between the defendants and the plaintiff, or to resolve the far more complex question of the nature and extent of such a responsibility in circumstances such as these where there may be competing issues of religious freedom.
[108] Just as some element of trust must be present before a relationship can be said to be fiduciary, so too there must be some form of betrayal before there can be breach of fiduciary duty. That does not mean that malice or bad faith must be shown in order to establish breach of fiduciary duty, nor is it necessary in every case to show a personal benefit to the fiduciary in order to find liability. However, simple negligence by a fiduciary in carrying out his or her duties will not be sufficient to constitute breach of fiduciary duty.
[110]...“Fiduciary” comes from the Latin “fiducia” meaning “trust”. Thus the adjective, “fiduciary”, means of or pertaining to a trustee or a trusteeship. That a lawyer can commit a breach of the special duty of a trustees, e.g., by stealing his client’s money, by entering into a contract with a client without full disclosure, by sending a bill claiming disbursements never made and so forth is clear . But to say that simple carelessness in giving advice is such a breach is perversion of words .The obligation of a solicitor of care and skill is the same obligation of any person who undertakes for reward to carry out a task. One would not assert of an engineer or a physician who had given bad advice and from whom common law damages were sought that he was guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty. Why should it be said of a solicitor? I make this point because an allegation of breach of fiduciary duty carries with it the stench of dishonesty-- if not of deceit then of constructive fraud...
[119] The plaintiff also sues for negligence. In order to establish a cause of action, she must show (i) that the defendants owed her a duty of care (ii) that the defendants breached that duty of care; (iii) that it was reasonably foreseeable she would be harmed as a result and (iv) that she was in fact harmed.
[113] Applying these principles to the case before me, I find there was no breach of fiduciary duty by any of the defendants. Assuming (without deciding) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, and assuming harm to the plaintiff from attending the two meetings her father and her treatment by members of the congregation thereafter, there was no element of betrayal or bad faith on the part of any of the defendants such as would make them liable for breach of fiduciary duty.
[127] The defendants in the case before me rely upon the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Bryan R. v. Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York (1999) M.E. 144. When the plaintiff Bryan R. was an adolescent he was molested by an adult member of his Jehovah’s Witness congregation, the defendant Baker. Some years before Baker had molested another child in the community. At the time, he was disciplined by the elders for his misdeeds, but later was permitted to resume his activities as an ordinary member within the congregation. Bryan alleged that the church and its elders were liable to him for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that manner in which the elders dealt with Baker’s earlier transgressions and the elders’ failure to warn him about Baker made it possible for Baker to obtain the plaintiff’s trust and to have the opportunity to assault him. The plaintiff’s claims against the church and the elders were dismissed. The court held there was no duty to protect members of the congregation from the wrongdoing of others. Further, any effort to hold the church responsible would require direct inquiry into the religious sanctions, discipline, and terms of redemption or forgiveness that were available within the church in the context of this claim, an inquiry that would require secular investigation of matters that are almost entirely ecclesiastical in nature. Bryan R . at para 27-28.
[142]...Mere foreseeability is not enough to establish a prima facie duty of care. The plaintiff must also show some proximity that the defendant was in a close and direct relationship to him or her such that it is just to impose a duty of care in the circumstances.
[160] First of all, there is considerable merit to the argument that if a competent adult does not agree with her religion’s position on a given topic, she has two choices: (I) she can choose to follow the church teaching because she wishes above all to remain a member of the faith; or (ii) she can leave the religion. Having freely chosen to stay in the religion and accept its principles, she cannot later complain that she has suffered harm as a result of her own decision. But can a person be said to be responsible for her own harm having freely chosen to follow her faith, when in fact the harm she sustained was not required by that faith? An example is illustrative. Suppose a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith is considering surgery and asks an elder if Jehovah’s Witnesses are permitted to have blood transfusions. She is told, accurately, that this is not permitted within the Jehovah’s Witness faith. Having considered the matter, she decides not to have a transfusion and sustains harm as a result. She has exercised free choice, deciding to follow the teachings of her religion rather than the advice of her medical doctor.
[161]...Vicki Boer believed that she was required to apply Matthew 18 in this situation. She was told this by Mr. Longworth to whom she had turned for help and advice. It is not fully clear whether Mr. Longworth misunderstood the advice he received from head office, or whether the advice given by head office was precisely what Mr. Longworth conveyed to the plaintiff. What is clear is that the advice he gave to the plaintiff was wrong. It was therefore the incorrect advice given to the plaintiff that caused her to atttend that meeting, not her free choice to follow a principle of her religion. The harm she sustained flowed from her reliance on the incorrect advice provided by Watch Tower through Mr. Longworth. It was not caused by any actual requirement of her religion. Ironically, in an action focused so extensively on principles of religious freedom, on the actual facts of the case there was no issue of religious freedom involved. It was all a mistake.
[187] Where Dr. Silver differed significantly with Dr. Awad is in respect of the cause of the plaintiff’s psychological difficulties. He accepted that it was emotionally difficult for the plaintiff to go through the December 29, 1989 meeting and confront her father about his abuse. However, in his opinion the sexual abuse by her father when the plaintiff was at a most vulnerable adolescent age was the most important causal event leading to her later emotional difficulties. Dr Silver also referred to other sources of the plaintiff’s anxiety, such as failed romantic relationships, her difficulties with her mother, difficulties arising from her split with her religion, and loneliness as a young wife and mother with her husband away for extended periods of time. Dr. Silver agreed that the process of confronting her father would likely have caused the plaintiff grief and anxiety and would have re-evoked the trauma of the original abuse. However, he also testified that the plaintiff was very strong-willed and that if she found the experience of repeating her story to be really traumatic, she could not have been “dragged” to the meeting. He testified that she unconsciously needed to repeat the original abusive trauma suffered as a result of her father’s abuse by repeating her story over and over. Dr. Silver disagreed strongly with Dr Awad’s opinion that the trauma of the December 29, 1989 confrontation meeting was worse than the original sexual abuse. Dr. Silver testified that the impact of the confrontation was negligible or insignificant when compared to the horrendous trauma of the original sexual abuse. He said it was like comparing a malignant tumor to a benign boil.
[188] Dr. Silver testified that the plaintiff appeared to feel a great deal of rage towards her father which he found to be understandable. However, she also demonstrated a desire to preserve her own good image of her parents. Dr. Silver believes the plaintiff had displaced her rage against her father by directing it against the Church; that she has a need to split things into good and bad with her parents perceived as good and the Church as bad.
[193] I accept the evidence of Dr. Silver that by far the most significant factor contributing to the plaintiff’s current difficulties is the sexual abuse by her father. I also accept his opinion that the plaintiff’s focus on the Church as the source of her problems is likely based on her need to displace her rage against her parents. It is important to note the role of the plaintiff’s mother in all of this. The plaintiff was certainly betrayed by her father. However, her mother was suspicious that her husband was abusing the plaintiff but said nothing. When the plaintiff went to her about it she did intervene but the matter was hushed up and Mrs. Palmer told her daughter not to tempt her father by dressing provocatively or wearing pajamas in his presence. Mrs. Palmer was angry with the plaintiff for bringing the matter up again in 1989 as she felt it was over and done with. Later, when the plaintiff left the Church, there was further ill will between mother and daughter and as the plaintiff poignantly stated in her evidence “My mother died hating me”. Mrs. Palmer chose her allegiance to her faith over her daughter. It is clear from all of the evidence that this betrayal by her mother has also been a factor contributing to the plaintiff’s emotional difficulties.
[194]...with or without the December 29, 1989 meeting I believe the plaintiff would have been in the same psychologically damaged state now. There were many factors compounding the plaintiff’s inability to recover fully from the sexual abuse...I recognize that to an extent the difficulties the plaintiff now experiences are related to her upbringing within the Jehovah’s Witness faith and the effects of leaving that faith. However, those are not actionable sources of harm. The only cause of action against the Church is in respect of its negligence in causing the plaintiff’s attendance at the December 29, 1989 meeting. In my opinion that one session, while traumatic, played only a minor role in creating the situation in which the plaintiff now finds herself.
[195] At the time of the incident giving rise to this cause of action, the plaintiff had already suffered the initial harm from the sexual abuse and was already suffering from its sequelae. Her current emotional difficulties stemming from the sexual abuse would have occurred in any event as would most of the other difficulties arising from leaving the Church. In my opinion, this case falls within what has been described as the “crumbling skull”: Athey v Leanati , [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458; W.R.B. v. Plint (2001) 93 B.C.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.S.C.) S.F.P. v. Macdonald (1999) 234 A.R. 273 (Q.B.); Whitfield v Calhoun (1999) 242 A.R. 201 (Q.B.).
[196] Therefore, Watch Tower is not liable in damages for the whole of the plaintiff’s current psychological problems...There was, however, psychological harm to the plaintiff as a result of the December 29, 1989 meeting...Damages in those most horrific cases range from $75,000.00 to $150,000.00. Taking all of those factors into account I assess general damages suffered by the plaintiff in this case at $5,000.00.
[197] There is no foundation on the facts to support an award for punitive damages. Most of the allegations against the defendants have not been established on the facts. The defendants who interacted with the plaintiff did not bear ill will toward her. They accepted the veracity of her account, were sympathetic to her situation and meant her no harm. The claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
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