Heard in 2002 for alleged offenses that took place in the late 1980's, it was an still is one of only a handful of Witness child abuse cases to actually make it to trial. Miss Boer was handed an enormous defeat, being ordered to pay a net sum of around $137,000 in legal fees to the Witnesses in the end (which the Witnesses did not even force her to pay). The only money she did get ($5000) was awarded to her because the elders involved did not follow official policy in instigating a 1989 meeting between the involved parties. No malice was found on the part of the Witnesses, and the judge even went out of her way, several times, to mention how much the elders actually did to help Miss Boer.
And yet, despite all of that, we still had and have opposers of Jehovah's Witnesses spinning the tale into a victory for Vikki Boer, successfully I might add, if only because there have been so few voices to challenge their crayola coloring of history. One of those elusive voices is, of course, that of good ol' Thirdwitness:
http://thirdwitness.com/childabuse/Boering.html
This, and the following post, will be another addition to that meager choir of voices, with a twist. What is left of this post will be a full, unabridged, html copy of the Judge's opinion. The post coming (hopefully) soon after this one will be what the Author considers important excerpts and quotations from the main transcript, for those of us who are too lazy or time constrained to read through all 30,000 words. I will provide both so that nobody can complain that the Author is cherry picking.
And so without further adieu, let's get this transcript started!
_______________________________________________________________________________
COURT FILE NO: 9K-CV-154117
DATE: 20030626
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN VICTORIA BOER
Plaintiff
Charles C. Mark for the Plaintiff
AND
BRIAN CAIRNS, STEVE BROWN, JOHN
DIDUR,
AND WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT
SOCIETY
OF CANADA
Defendants
Colin P. Stevenson and Maureen L.
Whelton for the Defendants
Heard September
9,10,11,12,13,16,17,18,19,20,23, and 24,2002
REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT
MOLLOY J.
Released June 26, 2003
(1) These reasons are organized
under the following headings:
A. INTRODUCTION (para 2)
B BACKGROUND (paras 2-7)
C THE PLAINTIFF’S POSITION (paras 8-21)
D THE DEFENDANTS’ POSITION (paras 22-25)
E RULINGS ON EVIDENCE (paras 26-33)
F LIMITATION PERIOD AND LACHES (paras 34-35)
(i) Negligence Claim (paras
35-42)
(ii) Breach of Fiduciary Duty (paras
43-45)
G FACTUAL FINDINGS (paras 46-99)
(i) Key Facts to be determined (para
46)
(ii) Mathew 18: 15-18 (paras
47-65)
(iii) Instructions Not toReport
to Child Welfare Authorities (paras 66-78)
(iv) Instructions Not to Seek
Treatment (paras 79-87)
(v)December 29,989 Meeting ( paras 88-93)
(vi ) January 31, 1990 Meeting (paras
94-98)
vi) Conclusions on Key Focus (para
99)
H. FAILURE TO REPORT AND FORBIDDING
MEDICAL TREATMENT (paras 100-104)
I. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (paras 105-118)
J. NEGLIGENCE (paras 119-132)
(i) Postion of the Parties (
paras 120-121)
(ii) The American Approach: No
Tort of Clergy Malpractice ( paras 122-130)
(iii) The Canadian Approach:
Balancing Religious Freedom Against the Rights of Others ( paras 131-140)
(iv) Analysis: The December 29,
1989 Meeting
(a )Causation ( para 141)
(b) Duty of Care ( paras 142-157)
(c) Religious Freedoms of the
Defendant and the Plaintiff’s Free Choice (paras 158-174)
(d) Standard of Care and Breach
(paras 175-177)
(e) The Individual Defendants (
paras 178-179)
(f) The Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of Canada ( para 180 )
(v) Analysis: The January 31,
1990 Judicial Committee Meeting ( para 181)
(vi) Analysis: The Church’s
Handling of Mr Palmer’s Abuse and Events After January 1990 ( para 182)
K. DAMAGES (paras 183-196)
L. JUDGEMENT AND COSTS (para 197)
A. Introduction
The plaintiff Victoria Boer seeks
punitive damages and damges for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against
the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Canada ( the governing body of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Canada) and three elders of that church. Her claim stems
from actions taken by the Jehovah’s Witnesses elders when, at the age of 19,
she disclosed to them that she had been sexually molested by her father during
her childhood. The plaintiff alleges that she was forced to confront her father
with these allegations in the presence of two male elders of her congregation,
an experience which she found to be traumatic. She said she was then required
to go through essentially the same exercise of confrontation again, this time
before three male elders, as part of a church disciplinary process against her
father, thereby compounding the trauma. She further alleges that Watchtower
failed to properly deal with the abuse by her father, failed to report it as
required by law, and directed her not to seek medical and psychological
treatment. The plaintiff testified that as a result of the defendant’s
wrongdoing she has suffered extreme emotional harm which was for years
untreated and which will require extensive therapy in the future.
B. Background
There is no material dispute as to
the general background leading up to Wathctower’s involvement in this matter.
The plaintiff was born in 1970 to Mary and Gower Palmer. She has an older
brother and two younger siblings. Both parents were Jehovah’s Witnesses and all
the children were raised in that faith, primarily as part of the congregation
in Shelburne, Ontario.
[4] The plaintiff attended public
school as a child but was not permitted to participate in after-school
activities with children not of her faith. The family attended religious
services several times a week. In addition, the plaintiff was required to spend
considerable time in prayer, religious studies and pioneering (spreading the
Jehovah’s Witness message to others, often by going door-to-door). She was
cautioned against falling into “worldly ways”. She was taught to accept a rigid
heirarchy of obedience; children must obey their parents; wives must obey their
husbands; members of the congregation must obey the governing elders; the
elders must obey the overall governing body, Watchtower. Independent thought
was not permitted. Higher education was discouraged, particularly for girls. It
was in mnay ways a closed and isolated society. Even though the members of the
congregation lived, worked and attended school in the general community, they
had little social interaction outside their faith.
[5] The plaintiff was sexually
molested by her father from about the age of 11 or 12 untill she was 15. The
abuse was serious, although it stopped short of actual intercourse. When the
plaintiff was about 15, she read a religious article about masturbation and
realized for the first time the nature of what had ben happening with her
father and that it was wrong. She spoke to her mother about it. Mrs. Palmer
told her daughter she had suspected something like this but had been afraid to
raise it. She counseled her daughter to be more modest in her dress and not to
wear pyjamas around her father. She also confronted her husband with the
plaintiff’s disclosure and he promised to stop the offensive conduct. The
matter was not discussed outside the family at that time. Mr. Palmer privately
apologized to the plaintiff for his conduct, while at the same time telling her
that after all, she had ‘enjoyed it too.” After that, there were no further
incidents of overt abuse, but more subtle things still happened, which Mr.
Palmer passed off as accidents or jokes.
[6] In 1989, when the plaintiff was
19, she left home to take a job as a live-in nanny in Toronto. She continued
her adherence to the Jehovah’s Witness faith, joining a Toronto congregation.
In the fall of 1989, the plainitff began to experience considerable anxiety
arising from the sexual abuse she had suffered years earlier. She had
flashbacks and recurring dreams about her father. She was fearful when caring
for the children in her charge and was worried that she might be accused of
doing something wrong. The plaintiff confided in a friend at the Totonto
Jehovah’s Witness congregation about these problems. The friend, Chris, advised
her that she had a responsibility to report her father’s conduct to the church
elders. Chris said there were two reasons for this. First, the past abuse was
affecting the plaintiff and he felt she needed spiritual help to deal with it.
Second, Chris pointed out that the plaintiff was aware of a sinner in the
Shelburne congregation ( her father) but the congregation was unaware of the
sinner being in their midst. Chris said that if Armegeddon came and the
plaintiff had not taken steps to bring her father’s sin into the open, she
could be held responsible for having jeopardized the salvation of the entire
Shelburne congregation. At Chris’ suggestion, the plaintiff contacted Sheldon
Longworth, an elder in the Toronto congregation, and reported the matter to
him.
[7] The Church’s response to this
report is the subject matter of this lawsuit. Many of the crucial facts from
this time on are in dispute.
C. The Plaintiff’s Position
[8] The plaintiff, Vicky Boer, had
several conversations with Mr. Longworth. He consulted with ‘head office’ in
Toronto to determine the appropriate steps to be taken. For one of his
interviews with her, which took place in her room at the home of her employers,
another male elder from Toronto was also present. Mrs. Boer testified that Mr.
Longworth was sympathetic and kind, but that he told her that she must invoke
Matt. 18: 15-18. This would require confronting her father in front of elders
from Shelburne and giving him a chance to repent. She found this prospect
terrifiying and told Mr. Longworth so. However, when he insisted this was the
proper course of action, she felt she had no choice but to obey the elders.
[9] Ms. Boer testified she asked Mr.
Longworth if she could get her mother to talk to her father about it, rather
than having to do it herself, but he said this was not possible. However, she
also testified that she did in fact telephone her mother and asked her to tell
her father to report himself to the Shelburne elders. Her evidence on this
point was somewhat confusing.
[10] Ms. Boer also testified that
she discussed her distress with the situation with a long-time childhood
friend, Jonathan Mott-Trille. His family were members of the Shelburne
Jehovah’s Witness congregation. She said she was crying and hysterical as she
told her friend Jonathon about having to confront and accuse her father.
Jonathan told her he thought the confronation was wrong and promised he would
discuss the matter with his father Frank Mott-Trille, who was a lawyer and also
an elder in the Shelbourne congregation.
[11] The next day, Ms. Boer met with
Jonathan and Frank Mott-Trille at their home in Toronto. Frank Mott-Trille told
her there was no requirement that she confront her father. He also advised her
that she should report the abuse to the Children’s Aid Society (“ C. A. S.” )
and recommended that she see a psychiatrist. Frank Mott-Trille actually
arranged an appointment for Ms. Boer with Dr. Kaplan, a psychiatrist
recommended to him by his daughter ( who is herself a doctor).
[12] In the meantime, Ms. Boer
received a telephone call from her father stating that a meeting had been
arranged for December 29, 1989 at the Palmer family home in Shelburne and that
two Shelburne elders , Steve Brown and Brian Cairns would be attending. Ms.
Boer testified at trial that she went to the meeting because Mr. Longworth had
directed that she must attend and she had no choice but to obey the elders.
[13] Ms. Boer described the meeting
as being very painful for her. It was conducted in the Palmer’s kitchen, with
the plainitff, her parents, and the two elders in attendance. The plaintiff was
asked to describe in detail what the plaintiff had done to her. She said she
objected to doing so but was told it was necessary. After she recounted the
details, her mother said this had all been dealt with in the family years
before and that her father had apologized. Ms. Boer testified that toward the
end of the meeting she told Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown that Frank Mott-Trille had
advised her to report to the Children’s Aid Society and had arranged for her to
meet with a psychiatrist. She said Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown told her Frank
Mott-Trille was “acting worldly” and that she should not listen to him.
Further, they told her that if she went to the C. A. S. the family would be
investigated, her father could lose his job, and her mother would be destitute.
She said that her mother was crying and telling her to listen to what the
elders were saying and that she should listen to them or her father could go to
jail. Finally, according to Ms. Boer, Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown indicated that
Mr. Palmer had demonstrated repentance and improved spirituality by being more
active in the faith and spending time ‘in service” (spreading the word about
Jehovah’s Witness to others outside the faith.)
[14] Ms. Boer did not contact the
C.A.S. and did not keep the appointment with the psychiatrist which Frank
Mott-Trille had arranged for her. She testified at trial that she knew she
needed help but did not seek it out because she had been told not to by the
elders.
[15] At the end of January, Ms. Boer
was contacted again and asked to attend a further meeting at her parents’ home.
Although she did not realize it at the time, the purpose of the meeting was to
conduct a Judicial Committee (an investigation by the elders) in respect of Mr.
Palmer’s wrongdoing and to determine what, if any, sanctions were appropriate.
According to Ms. Boer, this meeting was also conducted in the kitchen with all
the same people as the first meeting plus an additional elder, Dave Walker, who
was from a congregation outside Shelburne. She was asked ro repeat her story
because Mr. Walker had not heard it before. She was questioned closely about
the details so the elders could determine the level of sin Mr. Palmer had
committed. She testified at trial that her father started to deny some of the
allegations and to say that she was exaggerating. She felt she was under attack
and was so distraught that she had what she described to be a panic attack in
which everything appeared to be “swimming” and she “nearly passed out.”
[16] After the Judicial Committee
meeting Ms. Boer returned to Toronto to her live-in nanny job. However, she was
having such a difficult time emotionally that she resigned. Unemployed, and
without housing or any source of income, she eventually returned to live with
her parents in Shelburne. At this time, there was a lot of in-fighting among
the members of the congregation and between various of the elders. Ms. Boer
felt responsible for the trouble. Rumours leaked out about her having accused
her father of sexual abuse. However, since no sanctions appeared to have been
imposed on Mr. Palmer, the plaintiff believed there was a perception in the
community that she had fabricated these accusations. She felt ostracised by the
community. She became bulimic and developed ulcers.
[17] In July, 1991 the plaintiff
decided to move to Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. She had hoped to reconcile with a
former boyfriend who lived there. However, after arriving in Moose Jaw, she
discovered that he was in another relationship. In September, the plaintiff met
Scott Boer and by mid October, they were engaged to be married. He was aware of
the psychological problems she was having and persuaded her to attend
counseling. She attended five group sessions, but stopped going because she
said she found it too difficult to listen to other women recounting the abuse
they had suffered.
[18] Vicky and Scot Boer were
married in May 1992. There was considerable emotional upheaval surrounding the
wedding. Scott Boer is not a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, which was
problematic for Vicky’s friends and family, particularly for Mrs. Palmer who
was very devoted to her religion. Marriage outside the faith is frowned upon.
Originally, the wedding was booked for the Jehovah’s Witness church in
Shelburne. However, Mrs. Palmer cancelled all the arrangements without warning.
There was some question as to whether the Palmers would even attend. The
wedding did proceed in Shelburne, but before a Rabbi and in the Legion hall.
Although the plaintiff’s parents attended, very few other members of the
congregation did.
[19] Vicky and Scott Boer had three
children soon after their marriage, the third being born in 1995. Ms. Boer
continued to have emotional difficulty. The couple had marital problems as a
result. Scott Boer, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, was often away from
home for extended periods of time. Ms. Boer, alone at home with three small
children and sometimes in communities where she knew very few people, had a
difficult time. She also had little or no contact with her former friends in
the congregation. Scott and Vicky Boer attended counseling together for five
sessions in 1995. The family then moved to Quebec City where Ms. Boer had
difficulty finding a therapist who spoke English. In January 2000 Scott Boer
was posted to New Brunswicke, where the family still lives. After an initial
waiting period, Ms. Boer is again seeing a psychiatrist on a regular basis.
[20] After her marriage, Ms. Boer’s
relationship with her mother was very strained as Mrs. Palmer blamed her
daughter for exposing her father’s sin to the community. Ms. Boer left the
Jehovah’s Witness faith in 1995 or 1996, which also was a source of strain
between her and her mother. Mrs. Palmer began to say that the abuse had never
happened. Even when she was dying of cancer, Mrs. Palmer refused to see her
daughter. She died in 1998 without any reconciliation with her daughter Vicky.
[21] On August 25, 1998, Vicky Boer
commenced this action. She alleges that the individual defendants Brian Cairns
and Steve Brown acted negligently and in breach of fiduciary duty owed to her
in forcing her to go through the traumatic experience of recounting particulars
of her father’s sexual abuse in the presence of her father on two occasions.
She also alleges that Mssrs. Cairns and Brown were concerned only for the
reputation of the congregation and for her father. They attempted to “cover up”
the abuse by trying to keep it inside the community, by telling her not to get
medical help for herself, and by telling her not to report it to the secular
authorities. This deepened the trauma which the plaintiff had experienced and
prevented her from starting a healing process until many years later. The
defendant John Didur was a senior elder at the Watchtower head office and was
involved in an advisory capacity in respect of the steps taken by Sheldon
Longworth and by Mssrs. Cairns and Brown. The plaintiff alleges that Mr. Didur
and Watch Tower instructed and supported the other Jehovah’s Witness elders in
their handling of this matter and are equally responsible for the damages she
has sustained.
D. The Defendant’s Position
[22] The defendants deny having
caused any harm to the plaintiff. They point out that it was the plaintiff that
brought the matter to the Jehovah’s Witness elders and that she was an adult when
she did so. They allege that the extent of Sheldon Longworth’s involvement was
to find out from the plaintiff the nature of the complaint and then to tell her
that it should be dealt with through the Shelburne congregation elders. They
deny that Matthew 18: 15-18 has any application to this situation and deny
having told the plaintiff she must comply with Matthew 18.
[23] The issue before the Shelburne
congregation was a spiritual one: specifically a serious sin committed by a
member of the congregation and the appropriate sanction, if any, for that sin.
The defendants take the position that the manner in which the elders dealt with
Mr. Palmer is a question of religious faith and is not reviewable by this
court. They allege that Ms. Boer was present at the two meetings to ensure that
the elders had a full picture of what had occurred and not just her father’s
version. Mr. Brown and Mr. Cairns testified that they did not know ahead of
time what would be discussed at the first meeting. They further testified that
the second meeting was a Juducial Committee, which was required because of the
serious nature of the sin involved. They stated the plaintiff was present
during all parts of the first meeting but the family members were interviewed
separately for the Judicial Committee meeting. They deny the plaintiff was
required in that session to retell her story in front of her father.
[24] The defendants deny telling the
plaintiff not to report to C.A.S. and deny telling her not to get medical help.
On the contrary, they say they advised the plaintiff to get medical help and
understood she would be seing a psychiatrist recommended by Frank Mott-Trille.
Further, they required Mr. Palmer to report the abuse to his family doctor and
to the C.A.S. and followed up with C.A.S. to ensure this was done. The
defendants deny having covered up the abuse, although they did try to maintain
confidentiality for the protection of the plaintiff and other members of her
family. The defendants deny the plaintiff suffered emotional harm as a result
of the two meetings in which she participated.
[25] The defendants take the
position that any emotional harm sustained by the plaintiff flows from the
sexual abuse by her father and other difficult circumstances in her life, such
as her mother’s conduct and lack of support and difficulties in her marriage.
The defendants also submit that the plaintiff’s delay in bringing this action
is an absolute bar to her obtaining any recovery.
E. Rulings of Evidence
[26] During the course of the trial,
the plaintiff sought leave to present evidence from two witnesses about certain
characteristics or practices of the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization in
situations similar to this one. I ruled such evidence to be inadmissable, with
reasons to follow.
[27] The first witness, Professor
James Penton, is an historian and the author of a book entitled Apocalypse
Delayed . Mr. Mark, on behalf of the plaintiff, intended to elicit evidence
from Mr. Penton with respect to his conclusions about various characteristics
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, the way women are treated within that faith and the
functioning of Judicial Committees. Professor Penton’s evidence would be based
on his research and would constitute opinion. He does not have first-hand
evidence. However, Mr Mark did not deliver notice of his intention to call an
expert on this topic and did not serve an expert report on the defense as
required under the Evidence Act , R.S.O 1990, c E23. That alone is fatal
to the plaintiff’s request to call this evidence. The defence would have been
caught by surprise with no opportunity to prepare, nor to call its own evidence
to rebut the evidence of Mr. Penton.
[28] In any event, I am by no means
satisfied that expert evidence of this nature would have been admissable in
respect of these matters. It seems to me that I am in a position to determine
the relevant facts to the particular matters before me without the assistance
of an expert on these matters.
[29] The second witness proposed by
the plaintiff is Barbara Anderson, who was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
in New York from 1954 until her recent disfellowship (ejection from the faith).
The plaintiff proposed to elicit evidence from Ms. Anderson as to her knowledge
of how sexual abuse of children is dealt with within that religion and of
cover-ups of abuse within that society. Most of Ms. Anderson’s proposed
testimony would be hearsay. The plaintiff argued it would be admissable as
similar fact evidence that the actions of the defendants in this case was part
of a design, rather than negligence.
[30] The general test for the
admissibility of similar fact evidence in a civil trial is derived from Mood
Music Publishing Co. v DeWolf Ltd .; [1976] Ch 19, 1 ALL E.R. 763 (C.A.) In
that case, Lord Denning stated, at page 127 (Ch)
…in civil cases the court will admit evidence of similar facts if it is logically probative, that is if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue; provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side; and also that the other side has fair notice of it and is able to deal with it.
[31] The proposed evidence from Ms.
Anderson fails this test on every front. First, it is not logically probative
of any issue before me. Whatever may have been Ms. Anderson’s personal
experience with the Jehovah’s Witness faith, and whatever information she may
have gleaned about how child abuse cases were dealt with elsewhere, she has no
evidence whatsoever about the Toronto or Shelburne congregations or any of the
individuals in this case. Further, even her information about Watch Tower
generally relates to that organization in the United States. There is nothing
about her evidence that would assist in the very specific findings of fact I am
required to make about what happened in the case before me.
[32] Secondly, the defendants did
not have a fair opportunity to deal with this proposed evidence as they had no
notice of it until the first day of the trial.
[33] Thirdly, the proposed evidence
is oppressive and unfair. Even if the evidence could be seen as relevant (which
it is not) it would only be so if it were true. In order to establish the truth
of it, a trial within a trial would be required. There would be no effective
way for the defendants to mount a defense to the matters alleged by Ms.
Anderson, and the admission of such evidence would therefore be unfair to them.
F. LIMITATION PERIOD AND LACHES
[34] The actions of the defendants
which the plaintiff alleges to have caused her harm occurred in late 1989 and
in 1990. This action was commenced in August 1998, more than eight years later.
The defendants submit that the negligence claim is statute-barred because
because it was not commenced within the six-year limitation period and that the
plaintiff’s delay in commencing this action is also a bar to the equitable
claim based on breach of fiduciary duty. I reject the defendant’s position on
both points.
(i) Negligence Claim
[35] In M. (K.) v M. (H) (1992)
96 D.L.R. (4 th ) 289 (S.C.C.) the plaintiff sued her father for incest which
had occurred more than ten years earlier, basing her claim in both tort and
breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme Court of Canada applied the
discoverability ruled and held that the limitation period did not begin to run
untill the victim had a substantial awareness of the harm she had sustained and
of the casuative connection between the abuse and her symptoms; pages 305-306
and 314-315. Further, based on the scientific evidence at trial, the Court held
that in incest cases there is a presumption that “victims only discover the
necessary connection between their injuries and the wrong done to them (thus
discovering their cause of action) during some form of psychotherapy”, page
314.
[36] I agree with the submission of
counsel for the defendant that this presumptive rule applied by the Supreme
Court in M. (K.) v M. (H) does not apply here. However, the general
prinicples applied by the court as to the discoverability rule and its
rationale are directly applicable. The underlying rationale for the
discoverability rule is that a plaintiff ought not to be depreived of a cause
of action before she is aware, or could reasonably have been aware, that she
has one; Central Trust v Rafuse , (1986) 2 S.C.R. 147; Peizeiro v
Haberman , (1997) 3 S.C.R. 549. In determining the plaintiff’s level of
awareness, it is relevant to consider whether she could reasonably have known
both that the conduct of the defendant was wrong and that there was a casual
link between the wrong conduct and her psychological injury.
[37] It is clear the plaintiff knew
her father’s conduct was wrong by the time she had reached the age of majority.
However, I conclude from the evidence at trial that that she had not realized
the connection between that abuse and her own psychological state until years
later when she began therapy. In particluar, it was not untill 1995 when Ms.
Boer and her husband underwent marital counseling with Susan Frickland, a
social worker in Moose Jaw, that Ms. Boer substantially appreciated the
connection between the childhood issue and the anxiety and behavior she was
experiencing as an adult. Even then, the potential causual connection between
the behavior of the church elders and the plaintiff’s emotional suffering was
not apparent to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff was unhapy about many
aspects of her faith and how she had been treated by the elders, she did not
connect that unhappiness to any problems she was having until after she
attended a counseling session with Russell Scott in October 1997. She had gone
to see Mr. Scott because she felt emotionally overwhelmed raising her three
small children in Quebec City while her husband was away on military duties.
She told him of difficulties she was having in her relationship with her
parents, which led to her relating some of the problems she experienced growing
up as a Jehovah’s Witness. Ms. Boer also disclosed to Mr. Scott that she had
been sexually abused by her father and told him about the pressure from the
elders to confront her father about this in their presence. Mr. Scott told the
plaintiff that this confrontation had the potential to be emotionally damaging
and also suggested that she do some research of her own on the importance of
being raised in a “cult environment.”
[38] I find as a fact that it was
only after this session with Mr. Scott and the follow-up research she undertook
on her own through the Internet that Ms. Boer came to any understanding that
the actions of the elders in 1989 and 1990 could be a source of her
psychological problems. This action was commenced in 1998, which is within one
year of the plaintiff becoming aware of the possiblility of the cause of action
against thse defendants, and therefore is not caught by this limitation period.
[39] In M. (K.) v M. (H ),
supra, the Supreme Court of Canada held that it is appropriate to consider the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment in determining the applicability of a
limitation period, even where fraudlent concealment has not been specifically
pleaded. The doctrine applies to both common law and equitable causes of action
and operates to prevent the application of a limitation period where there is
conduct by the defendant that has prevented the plaintiff from being aware of
the cause of action. The term “fraudulent” in this context is to be interpreted
broadly and “is not confined to the traditional parameters of the common law
action” for fraud. M. (K.) v M. (H) at page 320. The Supreme Court in M.
(K.) v M. (H ) at page 320 adopted the following definition of the factual
basis for fraudulent concealment from 8 Hals.,4 th ed., p 413 para 919:
It is not necessary, in order to constitute fraudulent concealment of a right of action, that there should be active concealment of the right of action after it has arisen; the fraudulent concealment may arise from the manner in which the act which gives rise to the right of action is performed …(Emphasis added.)In order to constitute such a fraudulent concealment as would, in equity, take a case out of the effect of a statute of limitation, it was not enough that there should be merely a tortious act unkown to the injured party, or enjoyment of property without title, while the rightful owner was ignorant of his right; there had to be some abuse of a confidential position, some intentional imposition, or some deliberate concealment of facts .(Emphasis added.)
[40] In M. (K.) v M. (H) ,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that incest falls within the second category
of fraudulent concealment. LaForest J, writing for the majority, noted at p.
320, that “The fact that the abuser is a trusted family authority figure in and
of itself masks the wrongfulness of the conduct in the child’s eyes, thus
fraudulently concealing her cause of action.” Further, at p. 321 he held that
“incest is an abuse of a confidential position.” The Court went on to state
that the underlying premise supporting the application of the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment in cases such as these is that the courts will not allow
a limitation period to act as an instrument of injustice.
[41] In considering whether the
discoverability rule applies unfairly to the defendant in the case before me,
it is relevant to take into account the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. As
against the defendants before the court, this is not an incest case. However,
the claim does involve the alleged abuse of a confidential position. Further,
the fundamental precepts of the Jehovah’s Witness faith include obedience and
deference to the wisdom of the elders. A devout Jehovah’s Witness in the
position of the plaintiff at 19 years of age would be particularly vulnerable
to the power of the elders, having been raised her entire life to defer to
them. Her religious upbringing would not permit her to question the authority
of the elders, much less to realize that she might have a cause of action
against them. In these circumstances it would be unjust to the plaintiff in
1989 and 1990 as having any appreciation of wrongdoing that could amount to
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the elders. That
understanding only came to the plaintiff after she was no longer part of the
community and subject to their control. Given the social isolation and
dependence of the plaintiff at the time of the acts giving rise to the cause of
action, which isolation and dependence was fostered by Watch Tower and its
elders, it would be unjust to impose a limitation period commencing in 1990
without the mitigating effect of the discoverability rule.
[42] Accordingly, I conclude that
the discoverability rule should be applied in this case. As such the action was
commenced within the six-year limitation period, that period not having started
to run untill October 1997. Alternatively, at the very earliest, the period
started to run in 1995 when the plaintiff first realized that her emotional
difficulties stemmed from earlier abuse by her father and when, arguably, she
was sufficiently distanced from the Church to connect the conduct of the elders
to some of her problems.
(ii) Breach of Fiduciary Duty
[43] There is no limitation period
for breach of fiduciary duty, whether explicitly or by analogy. M. (K.) v M.
(H) , at page 328-333. However, since this is an equitable claim, it is
subject to the equitable defense of laches . Mere delay by a plaintiff
in commencing an action is not sufficient to support a defense of laches .
In addition, the plaintiff’s delay must either: (1) constitiute acquiescence in
the defendant’s conduct (2) result in circumstances that make the prosecution
of the action unreasonable, as for example where the defendants have
unreasonably altered their position as a result of the delay or are otherwise
prejudiced in the defence of the action as part of the delay.
[44] The defendants submit that the
plaintiff’s delay amounts to acquiescence. I disagree. The plaintiff cannot be
taken to have acquiesced in wrongdoing unless she had, or reasonably should
have had, knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts and their actionability. As
noted by LaForest J. in M. (K.) v M. (H) , at p 336-338, there is some
overlaps between the concepts of knowledge as part of acquiescence and the
application fo the discoverability rule in tort. However, the analysis is not
identical. In the case before me, Ms. Boer cannot be taken taken to have
acquiesced in wrongdoing by the elders (which allegedly occurred in 1989 and
1990) until she reasonably should have known it was in fact wrongdoing and that
she had a right of action (which occurred in 1997) In that context, it is not
equitable to consider her as having acquiesced in any wrongdoing by the
defendants. That branch of the laches doctrine does not , therefore,
provide a defence to these defendants.
[45] There was no evidence of any
change in postion by the defendants as a result of the plaintiff’s delay. The
individual defendants involved with the plaintiff confirmed their actions in
correspondence with the Watch Tower head office and that corresponence was
preserved. Sheldon Longworth kept handwritten notes of his discussion with the
plaintiff, and those also were preserved. To the extent that memories had
dimmed, the documentary record was available to refresh them. It seemed to me
from hearing the evidence of the defence witnesses that there was little, if
any, prejudice to the defendants as a result of the delay in commencing the
action. There was certainly not the sort of prejudice to support a conclusion
that it would be inequitable for the plaintiff’s action to proceed. On the
contrary. The unfairness of the plaintiff in dismissing her action because of
delay would be far greater than any unfairness to the defendants in having the
action proceed.
G. FACTUAL FINDINGS
(i) Key Facts to Be Determined
[46] There were many factual
disputes in the evidence at trial. Some of them are not necessary for me to
resolve in order to decide this case, particularly those relating to the
internal wrangling and power struggle among the elders of the Shelburne
congregation. Other disputes are central to the plaintiff’s claim and crucial
to her case. I consider the following disputed facts to be core issues
requiring resolution:
(a) Did Sheldon Longworth instruct
the plaintiff that she was required to confront her father pursuant to Matthew
18:15-18?
(b) If so, was the first meeting at the
Palmer home with Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown an application of Matthew 18:15-18?
(c) Did the defendants instruct the
plaintiff not to see a psychiatrist or get medical help for herself?
(d) Did the defendants instruct the
plaintiffnot to report her father’s abuse to the Children’s Aid Society?
(e) Was the second meeting at the
Palmer home an application of Matthew 18:15-18 and did it otherwise involve a
confrontation between the plaintiff and her father?
(ii) Matthew 18:15-18
[47] Much was said about Matthew
18:15-18 during the course of the trial before me, but a text of those verses
was never put before me. Mr. Longworth testified that applying this principle
is a three-part process. If you have a problem with someone, you should go first
to that person directly and attempt to resolve it. If that is not successful,
you should take someone with you to be a witness. If both those steps are
unsuccessful, the third step is to take the problem to the church elders. Set
out below is the text of the applicable verses from the King James Version of
the Bible. Although I am uncertain as to whether this version is the one used
by the Jehovah’s Witnesses, it appears to reflect the synopsis given by Mr.
Longworth.
Matthew
18:15
Morover if thy brother shall
trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if
he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother.
Matthew
18:16
But if he will not hear [thee then]
take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses
every word may be established.
Matthew
18:17
And if he shall neglect to hear
them, tell [it]unto the church, but if he neglect to hear the church, let him
be unto thee an an heathen man and a publican.
Matthew
18:18
Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye
shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on
earth shall be loosed in heaven.
[48] Vicky Boer testified that
Sheldon Longworth told her Matthew 18: 15-18 applied to her situation and required
her to confront her father about his wrongdoing. She stated she was extremely
upset about this prospect and she went to discuss it with her friend Jonathan
Mott-Trille. Her discussions with Jonathan Mott-Trille would certainly have
been some time around the middle of December 1989, but neither she nor Jonathan
Mott-Trille kept a record of the date and neither can pinpoint the date from
memory. Jonathan Mott-Trille does, however, have an independent recollection of
his discussion with the plaintiff. I found him to be an honest and unbiased
witness who tried his best to relate the facts accurately. I have no hesitance
accepting his evidence that Vicki Boer was extremely distraught and that the
focus of her emotional distress at the time was that she was being told she had
to invoke Matthew 18 and confront her father about his sexual abuse.
[49] Jonathan Mott-Trille further
testified that he had Vicki Boer wait while he went to discuss the problem with
his father, Frank Mott-Trille, on a no-name basis. He said he asked his father
if it was necessary for a victim of sexual abuse to confront her abuser in
front of male elders. It makes sense that Jonathan would consult his father on
this point as Frank Mott-Trille was both a lawyer and an elder in the Shelburne
congregation, and therefore likely to be knowledgeable about the process.
Jonathan’s evidence on this point is corroborated by his father Frank Mott
-Trille. Jonathan told the plaintiff that his father said there was no
requirement to confront the abuser and had offered his further assistance if
required.
[50] The plaintiff returned the next
evening to speak directly witrh Frank Mott-Trille. Both she and Frank
Mott-Trille testified that she advised him that she was instructed by Sheldon
Longworth to apply Matthew 18. They also testified that Mr. Mott-Trille told
her that this was a misapplication of the Scripture and that she was not
required to confront her father. Mr. Mott-Trille advised her to report the
matter to the Children's Aid Society amd recommended she see a psychiatrist for
counseling. Mr. Mott-Trille with the assistance of his son and his daughter
Rachel, who is a doctor, arranged an appointment for the plaintiff with a
psychiatrist, Dr. Kaplar. There is no evidence as to the specific date of that
appointment, although Mr. Mott-Trille's evidence was that it was made on an
urgent basis and would have beeen within a few days of his meeting with the
plaintiff.
[51] Both Jonathan Mott-Trille and
Frank Mott -Trille described Vicky Boer as extremely upset and possily
suicidal. Vicki Boer also said she was extremely upset and hysterical when she
met with them. I trust Jonathan Mott-Trille’s perception and find his
recollection to be reliable. I accept that Vicki Boer was upset, hysterical and
potentially suicidal when she first went to talk to her friend Jonathan.
However, Jonathan described the plaintiff as having calmed down somewhat after
being advised that there was no requirement in the Scripture for a
confrontation in this situation. That makes sense. The plaintiff went there
looking for help. She was treated sympathetically, given good advice, and told
there was no need to have a confrontation with her father. An appointment was
set up for her to start a process of counseling. One would expect that this
combination of kindness and concrete good advice would have had the calming
effect described by Jonathan. I do not find the perceptions of Frank
Mott-Trille to be as reliable. His evidence was at times exaggerated. I treat
it with caution as it appeared to me to be coloured somewhat by Mr
Mott-Trille’s hostility toward the elders and the Jehovah’s Witness
orgnaization. If Mr. Mott-Trille really believed Ms. Boer to be suicidal at the
time she left his home after their second meeting, I would not have expected
him ato suggest to her that she go by herself to report the matter to C.A.S.
Further, when the plaintiff failed to attend for her appointment with Dr.
Kaplar, I would have expected Mr Mott-Trille to take more urgent steps to
follow up if he had perceived her mentral distress at the time to be as acute
as he described it in his evidence at trial.
[52] I therefore conclude that Ms.
Boer was highly upset at the time and that the primary and immediate source of
her distress was the prospect of having to confront her father under Matthew
18. She would not have simply concluded on her own that Matthew 18 applied. She
must have been told that by somebody. The person she was relying upon for
advice at the time was Sheldon Longworth. He is the logical source of the
information.
[53] Sheldon Longworth testified at
trial. While he certainly remembered the incident with Vicky Boer, he was no
longer able to recall the specific details of precisely what was said in each
of his discussions with her and with his advisers at the Watch Tower head
office. However, the notes he kept at the time are available and are of
considerable assistance. Those notes though somewhat sketchy, were made
contemporaneously and I find them to be highly reliable. Also I find Mr.
Longworth to be an honest and impartial witness. When he could not remember a
detail he said so. When he testified as to a particular event which he did
recall, I accept his evidence.
[54] Mr. Longworth’s notes indicate
that he first spoke with the plaintiff on December 11, 1989 when she called him
for advice. He got some further information from the plaintiff, consulted with
head office on December 12 and read a 1988 Watch Tower directive on how to deal
with child abuse in order to inform himself. On the evening of December 12, he
met with the plaintiff at his apartment and she provided him with the further
particulars he requesteed, including the fact that there were two young
children still in the home. It would appear from Mr. Longworth's notes that no
advice was given to the plaintiff on this occasion, but that he promised her he
would look into it and get back to her quickly.
[55] On December 13, 1989 Mr.
Longworth spoke with John Didur at head office and got some advice as to how to
deal with the matter, which he passed on to the plaintiff later that same
evening. Mr. Longworth testified at trial that the main thrust of the advice he
gave the plaintiff after December 12 was that this matter should be dealt with
by the elders in Shelburne and that her father should contact them to ensure
this happened. I accept his evidence on this point as being credible, supported
by his notes, and consistent with how the matter proceeded thereafter.
[56] However, it is also apparent
from his testimony and from his notes that he did discuss Matthew 18 with
advisers from head office and that he did tell the plaintiff to apply Matthew
18. Mr. Longworth’s notes on December 13 indicate that Mr. Didur told him that
Vicki should “apply Mattt 18 to go to her father and tell him to go to the
elders and straighted [sic] out”. He further noted that he told this to Vicki
and suggested she call her father and give him a week to go to the elders or
Vicki would go to them” And that Vicky said she would do this.
[57] The next note Mr. Longworth
made was on December 15 when he wrote that Vicki had approached him and said
she was afraid of her father and that it was “too hard” for her to talk to him
directly. He told her he would look into it and get back to her. His notes
indicate that he then discussed this with Mr. Kutschke (another elder at head
office) who advised that “she would need to apply Matthew 18 and call her
father”. His notes of December 16 further state that later that evening he
spoke to Vicki “and tried to help her see necessity of applying Matthew 18
which meant going to her father”. At that time Vicki said she would consider it
but that maybe she would call her mother instead. His final note that day in
response to this alternate suggestion was “So that is how I left it”
[58] Mr. Longworth testified that
the plaintiff was very upset about the situation and about confronting her
father under Matthew 18. He said she was crying while talking about these
matters. However he did not perceive her level of distress to be as extreme as
was described by Jonathan Mott-Trille. The likely explanation for this minor
descrepancy is that the plaintiff simply did not display the same degree of
distress before Mr. Longworth. She was a close friend of Jonathan’s and felt
more at liberty to break down in front of him than she would do in front of Mr.
Longworth who was a virtual stranger to her.
[59] On December 17 the plaintiff
called Mr. Longworth and advised him that he had called her mother as “she
still felt she couldn’t call her father” and that her morer would advise her
father to go to the elders in Shelburne. Obviously this did occurr as Mr. Palmer
called Mr. Longworth the next day and said he would cooperate fully. After
further consultation with John Didur, Mr. Longworth told Mr. Palmer to go to
the elders of his congregation to straighten the matter out.
[60] On December 18, 1989 Mr. Longworth
and Mr. Novak visited the plaintiff at the home where she was working as a
nanny. Mr. Longworth’s note from that day states:
We commended her for her coming
forward for help and for talking to us to what must have been a very hard thing
to do. We encouraged her to speak up if she is required to talk to the
elders in Shelburne and tell them the facts . (Emphasis added)
[61] Thereafter the Toronto elders
had no further involvement, having left the matter to the Shelburne elders to
handle. The last note made by Mr. Longworth is headed “Dec 21/89 phone call
from Vicki about 6:00 pm” It then states:
Went to Bro. Mott-Trille as she is
very close to him. Her father is saying he can’t remember very much what he
done to her. Vickie said she was having a hard job handling this and felt her
family father and mother was upset at her bringing this up.
Somewhat confusingly, this notation
is followed immediately by a note which states “Dec 18/89 advised Fred [Novak]
as to above 7:30 pm”. Obviously Mr. Novak could not have been advised on the
18th of something which occurred on the 21 st . One of the dates is an error,
but it is unclear whether they both occurred on December 18th or on the 21st.
[62] In my view much of the
confusion surrounding the Matthew 18 issue stems from the fact that it does not
actually apply to a situation such as this one. I accept the evidence of John
Didur that it is not now the policy of the Jehovah's Witness to require a
victim of abuse to proceed through the steps envisioned in verse 15-18 of
Matthew 18, nor was that the policy in 1989. He explained that Matthew 18
applies to private disputes brween people such as disputes over financial
matters, and cannot be applied to a serious sin against God's aws, such as
child abuse. I understand why the defence witnesses are genuinely puzzzled as
to how this could have come up in this situation. However, I am confident that
Matthew 18 was mentioned specifically to the plaintiff and that she was told it
applied. Further I am confident that it was after receiving this advice that
she spoke to the Mott-Trilles.
[63] On March 29, 1991 (more than a
year after these events occurred) Frank Mott-Trille wrote a letter to the legal
department of Watch Tower in New York in which he stated that the plaintiff
came to his home on December 11 and 12 1989. That cannot be correct. Mr
Longworth's notes made at the time are a more accurate and reliable source for
establishing chrotology. His own first discussions with the plaintiff were on
December 11 and 12 and it appears fom his notes that the first time he
considered the application of Matthew 18 was on December 13. It is probable
that he said something to the plaintiff about Matthew 18 on that same date and
that Ms. Boer went to see Jonathan Mott-Trille after that. It is also probable
that the plaintiff went to the Mott-Trille home on two consecutive days
sometime between December 13 and December 18 or 21. On December 15 the
plaintiff suggested to Mr. Longworth that she migh t speak with her mother
rather than her father. Then on December 17 she did in fact call her mother.
The next day December 18 Gower Palmer spoke with Mr. Longworth and was told to
report the matter to the Shelburne elders. In Mr. Mott-Trille’s letter of March
29, 1991 he states that about two days after he saw the plaintiff he received a
call from her father inquiring about the possibility of his acting for him on
serious criminal charges that might arise. By that date Mr. Palmer was already
aware that this matter had been raised by his daughter. It follows that the
call to Mr. Mott-Trille could not have been earlier than December 17.
[64] The plaintiff gave conflicting
evidence about whether she was told it would be acceptable to ask her mother to
get her father to contact the Shelburne elders, or whether she simply took this
step against the advice and direction of Mr. Longworth. Her recollection on
this point is not reliable. It would appear that something was likely going on
between December 13 (when Matthew 18 was first mentioned to her) and December
17 (when she called her mother rather than her father). It seems to me that the
logical conclusion is that her discussions with the Mott-Trilles happened
sometime between December 13 and December 17. On December 15 Ms. Boer told
Sheldon Longworth it was simply “too hard” to talk to her father about this. On
the 16th he encouraged her to call her father, but she said maybe she would
call her mother instead. I find as a fact that Mr. Longworth did not force the
issue at that point, but more or less acquiesced in the plaintiff’s proposal to
call her mother. I further find that the plaintiff’s decision to take this
course of action was likely based on the advice of Mr. Mott-Trille that Matthew
18 did not apply.
[65] Based on the evidence of the
witnesses and the limited documentation available, I conclude on a balance of
probabilities as follows:
(a) Mr. Longworth told Ms. Boer on
more than one occasion that Matthew 18 applied and tht she should speak
directly to her father about her abuse.
(b) This advice was an inaccurate
application of the Scripture.
( c ) Ms. Boer was extemely upset at
the prospect of having to confront her father. Her level of distress was
accurately described by her and Jonathan Motte-Trille. Although Mr. Longworth
knew she was upset, and indeed crying much of the time, he did not perceive her
distress to be as acute as that described by Mr Motte-Trille.
(d) Ms. Boer was given correct
advice by Mr Motte-Trille that Matthew 18 did not apply.
(e) Thereafter she spoke to Mr.
Longworth and told him that she might speak to her mother rather than her
father. Mr. Longworth did no press the point. She then actually spoke to her
mother and asked her mother to direct her father to contact the elders.
(f) Up to December 29, 1989,
although there had been discussison about the requirement of invoking Matthew
18, it was not actually applied and Ms. Boer did not have any direct
confrontation with her father.
( iii) Instructions Not to Report to
Child Welfare Authorities
[66] Before considering whether the
December 29th meeting was an application of Mathew 18, I will set out my
factual findings on the issues of medical treatment and reporting to the authorities
as my findings on these points have an impact on whose evidence I accept as to
the details of the December 29 meeting.
[67] Ms. Boer testified that at the
first meeting at her parent’s home which took place on December 29 , 1989 Mr.
Cairns and Mr. Brown warned her against reporting her father’s abuse to the
Children’s Aid Society (“C.A.S.”). She said that she had mentioned to them that
Frank Mott-Trille advised her to speak to the C.A.S. and had arranged an
appointment for her to meet with a psychiatrist. According to Ms. Boer, the two
elders specifically told her not to go to the C.A.S. because there would be an
investigation and her father could lose his job, leaving her mother destitute.
She was adamant this this conversation occurred with the elsers and that it was
not a conversation with only her parents. Ms. Boer’s evidence on this point is
completely at odds with all the other evidence.
[68] One of the first things Sheldon
Longworth did upon hearing the plaintiffs first disclosure was to consult the
1988 Watchtower letter setting out the policy for dealing with cases of sexual
abuse of children. Likewise, Brian Cairns turned to this document immediately
after the December 29 meeting to determine what should be done. The 1988
Watchtower document was an exhibit at trial. I do not need to decide whether
the directions set out therein are completely in accordance with the
requirements of the relevant child protection statute in 1988 or in 1989/1990.
Nothing in this case turns on that legal issue. What is clear from the document
is that the official policy of the church was to report child abuse cases to
child welfare officials. Further, the policy advises that elders as ministers
have a positive duty to ensure that child abuse is reported. Although the
policy suggests it is permissible to require the offender or family members to
report the matter to their own physician who would then have a duty to report,
the policy also emphasizes the need for the elder to follow up to ensure that
the reporting in fact occurred.
[69] Steve Brown and Brian Cairns
both denied having told the plaintiff that she should not report the abuse.
Both testified they told the family they would consider what needed to be done
and get back to them. The plaintiff also confirmed this was how the meeting was
left. Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown also testified that they asked a lot of
questions to ascertain whether the two younger children were at any risk for
abuse at Mr. Palmer’s hands, but were convinced there was no such danger.
[70] It is clear that both Mr.
Cairns and Mr. Brown were aware of the reporting requirement However, they were
also aware that the Palmer family had a previously scheduled vacation to go
Florida for three weeks in January, for which they were scheduled to depart
shortly after the December 29 meeting. Since they were satisfied there was no
risk to the younger children they decided to take no steps until the family
returned from vacation.
[71] Mr. Cairns called Mr. Didur at
Watch Tower head office shortly after the December 25 meeting. Mr Cairns
testified, and I accept, that Mr. Didur said reporting was clearly required
because there were still children in the home. Mr. Didur said the ideal situatuion
would be ato get the abuser to report himself, either to a doctor or the
C.A.S., but that the elders had to report if Mr. Palmer failed to do so. By
this time the Palmers were in Florida and Mr. Didur and Mr. Cairns agreed it
would be permissable to delay reporting until their return.
[72] Mr Cairns wrote a letter to
Watch Tower head office on January 21, 1990. This was before the Palmers had
returned from their vacation. I am satisfied this letter was written and sent
at the time of the events. It is clear from the letter that Mr. Cairns was
aware of the reporting requirement. He mentions having discussed with the
family the possibility of Mr. Palmer going to a medical docor to report the
problem, but without giving any final direction. The response from Watch Tower,
dated January 25 is also clear about the necessity of reporting
[73] Mr. Cairns tesified, and I
accept, that when the Palmers returned from Florida, Mr. Cairns told Mr. Palmer
he had to report himself to a medical doctor and Mr. Palmer agreed to do so.
Later Mr. Cairns was advised that both Mary and Gower Palmer had gone to the
doctor on January 29, 1990. Mr. Cairns reported to the Watch Tower head office
that Mr. Palmer had talked to a docor that day but that the doctor had
indicated she was unsure whether there was an obligation to report to C.A.S. in
this situation (presumably because the complainant was no longer a child).
[74] A few days later Mr. Cairns and
Mr. Didur spoke again by phone. Mr Cairns testified that Mr. Didur instructed
him to ensure a report was made to the Childrens Aid Society since it was
unclear whether the Palmers’ doctor would be reporting. Mr. Cairns therefore
called Mr. Palmer and told him that he should personally report himself to the
C.A.S. Mr. Palmer reported back to the elders that he had taken his wife and
two youngest children with him to the Children’s Aid Society and reported the
matter to them. Mr. Brown testified, and I accept, that he personally called
the C.A.S. office immediately thereafter to confirm the report had been made.
The plaintiff acknowledges Mr. Palmer did in fact report himself to the
Children’s Aid Society.
[75] I find that Mr. Cairns, Mr
Brown, and Mr. Didur were aware of the reporting requirement and fully intended
to comply with it. I need not comment on whether they made the right decison to
allow Mr. Palmer to go on vacation with his family before any report was made,
nor whether it was appropriate to have the initial report come through Mr.
Palmer rather than from the elders. There is no need to resolve those points to
decide this case. However, it is clear there was no plan to cover up this abuse
from the authorities. On the contrary, all of the elders involved were
consistent in their resolve to ensure the Children’s Aid Society was made aware
of these allegations. Further, it was because of the elders that the C.A.S. was
in fact notified. Based on this alone, it is improbable that the elders told
Ms. Boer in December 29, 1989, that she should not tell the authorities because
her father could go to jail and her mother end up destitute.
[76] In additon to the improbability
of Ms. Boer’s evidence in this isssue and the documents cooborative of the
defendants’ version, I have taken into account my findings as to the
credibility of Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown. I believe both were telling the truth
as best as they could recall it. Mr. Cairns, in particular, struck me as a
thoroughly honest witness. He was careful never to overstate. He was even
careful to ensure that he was testifying as to what he could actually remember
as opposed to what he had heard in court earlier in the trial and accepted to
be true. I am confident he did not lie to the court. I am also confident that
he could not simply be mistaken as to whether he specifically told Ms. Boer
that this should not be reported
[77] It follows that I am accepting
Mr. Cairns’ evidence on this point in preference to that of Ms. Boer. I wish to
emphasize that this does not mean I found Ms. Boer to be a less than honest
witness. That is absolutely not the case. Ido not question her honesty and
integrity. What I do question is her ability to recall accurately and
specifically who said what at a meeting thirteen years ago-- a meeting which,
by her own account, was highly emotional and traumatic for her. I do no doubt
that following the meeting and perhaps eveen before and during the meeting
there was pressure on Ms. Boer to put the interests of her mother and other
family members ahead of addressing the abuse by her father. I do not doubat
that she was asked to consider what would hapen to the family if her father
went to jail and her mother became destitute. Her own evidence, which is
corroborated to some extent by notes of others at around that time, is that her
parents were angry with her for having brought this matter up again. If there
was pressure on Ms. Boer to “bury” the issue and to avoid reporting to the
authorities, it most likely came from her mother. Given Mrs. Palmers’ devotion to
her religion, it is entirely possible that she cast this as a religious duty
and that over the years Vicki Boer has come to believe it emanated from the
elders. However, her recollection is mistaken. I find as a fact there was so
suggestion from Mr. Bown or Mr. Cairns that the matter should be covered up or
that it should not be reported to the authorities.
[78] I do not consider it necessary
to deal extensively with the evidence of Frank Mott-Trille on this point. He
did not have first-hand knowledge of the communications between Watch Tower
head office and the elders who were directly involved in dealing with the
matter. I conclude that his outrage was more directed towards how the issue was
handled from a religious point of view, whether the appropriate decision-making
rules for the congregation were followed and whether the appropriate sanctions
were imposed against Gower Palmer. If his concern was truly that there was a
cover-up or failure to report to child welfare authorities, he had an obvious remedy.
He was the first elder of the Shelburne congregation to become aware of the
abuse and as a result of the report directly to him in mid-December by Ms. Boer
. However he took no steps himself to bring the matter to the attention of the
authorities at that time.
(iv) Instructrions Not to Seek
Treatment
[79] Ms. Boer testified at trial
that she was specifically advised by the elders at the December 29, 1989
meeting that she should not see a psychiatrist or get medical help. She was
adamant that this instruction came from the elders. She said she believed she
needed counseling and the only reason she did not seek help was because she had
been instructed not to.
[80] Brian Cairns testified at trial
that he never instructed Ms. Boer not to get medical help. On the contrary he
suggested it would be a good idea. Mr. Brown supported Mr. Cairns’ evidence. He
testified that Ms. Boer was told it was a matter of personal choice whether she
sought psyhchiatric help and was never discouraged from doing so. I accept
their evidence.
[81] I am convinced of the honesty
of Mr. Cairns on this point. I find his evidence to be compelling not just
because I believe him to be a truthful witness but also because he provided
personal information about his own circumstances and those of his family which
convince me that he would never have counselled a young woman in the plaintiffs
position to avoid psychiatric help. Mr. Cairns said that at the time of the
December 29 meeting he was enormously sympathetic to Ms. Boer’s situation. He
considered what Mr. Palmer did to be a “horrible thing” and he immediately
thought about his own two teenage daughters who were close to the plaintiffs’
age at the time. He also testified that his wife is a surviver of childhood
abuse and he is fully aware that the harmful effects of such abuse can live on
for many years. Further he is not averse to psychiatry. He revealed he suffers
from depression himself and has sought treatment from a psychiatrist on more
than one occasion.
[82] Mr. Cairns’ evidence is
corroborated by the documents produced at trial which were written in early
1990. In Mr. Cairns’ letter of January 21, 2990 he reported to Watch Tower:
The daugher was quite upset while
trying to tell us about it. She expressed that she felt much better emotionally
now that we had heard her out. The elders gave encouragement to her and
suggested that in addition to getting spiritual refreshment she may want to get
medical assistance if she felt it was necessary . That would be her decision
and we would not push that.
[83] It is unlikely that the
plaintiff failed to see a psychiatrist because of anything said by the
defendant. Frank Mott-Trille had arranged an appointment for Ms. Boer with Dr.
Kaplan. He said this would have been within a few days of when he met with Ms.
Boer in mid-December 1989. It makes sense that it would have been soon after
that date as Mr Mott-Trille and his son both thought Ms. Boer might have been
suicidal. It is unlikely they would have delayed several weeks. The meeting
with the elders was on December 29, 1990. It is most likely that by then Ms.
Boer had already failed to attend the appointment with Dr. Kaplan before the
Shelburne elders were even involved. Thus it would appear she was already
reluctant to talk to a psyhchiatrist before she met with the elders. According
to Dr. Awad, the psychiatrist called as an expert witness at trial by the
plaintiff, this is not unusual. He testified that 50 percent of adolescents
will fail to attend their first scheduled appointment and that in his
experience it is not uncommon to try five times before succeeding in having the
patient actually attend for counselling.
[84] In his January 29, 1990 letter
Mr. Cairns asked Watch Tower for guidance on a number of questions including
whether it was necessary for the elders to insist that “both parties” receive
psychiatric help. Watch Tower responded that following the handling of a case
both the accuser and accused might need the assistance of a physician or
psychologist for mental and emotional recovery and that this should be
recommended. The letter then states that the elders can “only recommend” and
that the kind and extent of professional help sought is a matter of personal
decision.
[85] In the minutes of the Judicial
Committee meeting dated January 31, 1990, the elders note their understanding
that the plaintiff would be going to a psychiatrist at the encouragement of
Frank Mott-Trille. It was apparently the understanding of other elders that Ms.
Boer would be getting psychiatric care as recommended by Mr. Mott-Trille. The
Children’s Aid Society was under the same impression.
[86] I find that the defendants did
not impede Ms. Boer from getting psychological counselling, but rather that
they encouraged it. She received the same encouragement from Mr Mott-Trille.
She elected, as was her right, not to act on that advice. It was years later
that she finally decided to seek treatment and initially that was for problems
which she did not immediately connect to the sexual abuse. The delay in
obtaining treatment is in no way attributable to the defendants.
[87] Again I hasten to add that my
finding on this issue, although completely at odds with Ms. Boer’s evidence at
trial, does not mean I think she has been untruthful. I accept that she
honestly believes she was instructed not to get counselling. However, she was
under enormous stress at the time and was subjected to equally horrible
pressure at home and in her religious community in the months thereafter. This
has affected her ability to recall accurately the particulars of what was said
at those meetings with the elders. It may well be the case that she could not
face talking to another person about the abuse at that time, or even that she
was persuaded that it was not an appropriate course of action for religious
reasons. After the fact she has misremembered this discomfort about seeing a
doctor as having been a directive from the elders. However I am satisfied on
the evidence that she is mistaken. The elders never attempted to persuade her
to avoid medical help.
(v) December 29, 1989 Meeting
[83] It was Gower Palmer who set up
the December 29, 1989 meeting. He had been told by his wife and by Sheldon
Longworth that he needed to inform the Shelburne elders of his abuse of his
daughter Vicky. Mr . Palmer telephoned Steve Brown and asked him to come to his
home to talk about an important family problem. Mr. Brown did not know the
nature of the problem. Mr. Brown asked Mr. Cairns to come as well because he
was the senior elder (presiding overseer) of the Shelburne congregation.
Neither Mr . Brown nor Mr. Cairns knew what the meeting was about untill after
they got there and heard Mr. Palmer’s explanation. Ms. Boer testified she
received a call from her father telling her the time of the meeting and she
felt she had to attend because of the previous discussions she had with Mr.
Longworth
[89] All parties agree that the
meeting took place in the Palmer kitchen and that Mr. Palmer, Mrs Palmer, Mr.
Cairns, Mr. Brown,and the plaintiff were all present at the same time. The
parties also essentially agree on how the meeting started. They opened with a
prayer following which Mr. Palmer said he had something that needed to be told.
He then revealed some of the things he had done to his daughter Vicki several
years earlier when she was still a child.
[90] There is some divergence
between the evidence of Vicki Boer and the evidence of Messrs Cairns and Brown
as to how the meeting proceeded from there. I have already ruled that I do not
accept Ms. Boer’s evidence that the elders told her not to seek medical
assistance and not to report the abuse to the authorities. These were important
points about which she was certain in her own mind. Her memory on those was
inaccurate. I am therefore very reluctant to rely on her evidence as to other
details of the meeting where her evidence conflicts with that of Mr. Cairns and
Mr. Brown.
91 Although Ms Boer may have
perceived the meeting as a confrontation and while I am certain that it felt
that way to her, I find that it did not actually proceed that way. Mr. Palmer
opened by confessing some of what he had done. I accept the elders’ description
of the way Mr. Palmer conducted himself, that he was openly upset, stammering,
tearful, and ashamed. Like them I was struck by the similarity of their
descriptions and the evidence given by Scott Boer of how Mr. Palmer appeared on
the much later occassion when he discussed it with him. I also accept the
elders’ description of Vicki Boer as being very upset and weeping but
nevertheless able to give a coherent account of what happened. At times she
added to or corrected details of Mr. Palmer’s account. The elders asked her
questions so they could determine the extent and nature of the abuse. Ms. Boer
admitted under cross examination she did not complain to Mr. Cairns and Mr.
Brown that she did not want to be there and never asked or attempted to leave.
[92] It is difficult to see what Mr.
Cairns and Mr. Brown could have done differently. They were sympathetic to the
plaintiff. She understood they believed her story. They knew it was Ms. Boer
who had started the process. They played no role in causing her to be there and
were unaware of any ambivalence on her part. They had no reason to believe that
she felt she was under any compunction to be there, nor were they aware that
this session had anything to do with Matthew 18. It was reasonable, and indeed
appropriate in the circumstances for them to ensure that the plaintiff’s voice
was heard and that they not rely solely on Mr. Palmer’s version of the events.
[93] That said, I accept Ms. Boers’
evidence that this was a traumatic experience for her. She was young and
vulnerable and had not yet dealt with any of the complex issues arising from
being the victim of childhood sexual abuse. Further, because of the sheltered
religious environment in which she had been raised she did not feel she had any
choice but to follow the process directed by the Jehovah’s Witness elders whom
she had spoken to in Toronto. That process was psychologically harmful to her,
the extent of which I will deal with later in these reasons. Although Mr.
Cairns and Mr. Brown cannot be faulted in this regard, the fact remains that
Ms. Boer participated in this whole process because of the direction she
recieved from Mr. Longworth and Watch Tower, and she did suffer some injurty as
a result.
(vi) The January 31, 1990 Meeting
[ 94] It is clear that the January
31 1990 meeting was a Judicial Committee to determmine appropriate sancrions to
be imposed on Mr. Palmer as a result of his sin, the sexual assault of his
daughter.
[95] After the December 29, 1989
meeting Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown were satisfied that nothing further need be
done. They had recommended medical attention for the whole family. They did not
believe the two younger children were in any danger but were nevertheless
ensuring that the appropriate authorities were notified. From a spiritual
perspective they felt Mr. Palmer was genuinely repentant and had atoned for his
sins by being more active in his religion. They believed as well that he had
not repeated this sin and was a changed person. They therefore decided to do
nothing further. However, Frank Mott-Trill took the position that the matter
had not been dealt with properly, that the sin was serious and required more
serious sanctions and that a full Judicial Committee of three elders was
required to make a decision. He rasied the matter at a January meeting of the
elders. it was directly because of his intervention that the January 31, 1990
meeting with the Palmer family took place.
[96] Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown
ultimately agreed with Mr Mott-Trilles argument that a full Judicial Committee
was appropriate. They asked Mr. Mott-Trille to be the third member of the panel
but he declined on the basis that he had a conflict. He took the position that
they had a conflict as well but Watch Tower head office did not agree. Since no
other local elder would agree to serve on the committee Mr. Cairns asked Dave
Walker, an elder in a nearby congregation, to participate. There was much
evidence at trial as to whether the committee was properly constituted. I do
not need to decide that point in order to deal with the plaintiff’s claims in
this action and I therefore will not do so.
[97] Ms. Boer testified that the
Judicial Committee meeting proceeded in exactly the same manner as the December
29 meeting, with all of the participants in the kitchen at the same time, and
with her being required to recount her story in front of her father. She said
it was very confrontational, even worse than the first meeting and that she had
a panic attack during the session. However, all three elders who testified at
trial said that they spoke separately to each of Gower Palmer, Mary Palmer and
their daughter Vicky. Having obtained Mr. Palmer’s confession they told Vicki
what he had said and asked for her comments. The elders testified that there
was no confrontation beftween the plaintiff and her father. She corrected some
of the things he said which she felt had minimized what happened. The evidence
of Mr. Cairns, which I accept, was that this format was deliberately chosen to
make it easier for the plaintiff. The elders said the plaintiff was upset and
crying but able to regain her composure. They realized this was difficult for
her but she never objected to being there nor to the process. After speaking
separately to the three family members, the elders met again with Mr. Palmer to
discuss with him the sanctions to be imposed. They then met with all three
family members briefly to encourage their spiritual progression and ended the
meeting with prayer.
[98] In my opinion Ms Boer is very
confused about this last meeting. I have already noted above that her memory of
the details of these meeetings is not wholly reliable. The evidence given by
the three elders at trial is consistant with the minutes of the meeting which
they prepared immediately afterwards. Ms. Boer did not make any notes at the
time. It is apparent that she has done her best to reconstruct the events of
1989 and 1990 many years later. I note that her earlier attempts to put a
chronology together contained obvious errors and were inconsistent which much
of her evidence at trial. Where her evidence conflicts with that of Mr. Cairns
as to what happened at the Judicial Committee meeting on January 31, I accept
his evidence.
(vii) Conclusions on Key Facts
[99] I set out in paragraph [46]
above five crucial questions of fact that neededd to be resolved. I have
concluded aas follows
(a) Sheldon Longworth instructed the
plaintiff that she was required to confront her father pursuant to Matthew
18:15 - 18. Initially she was instructed to tell her father to report his sin
to the elders in Shelburne. The plaintiff did not actually do this. Instead
with the acquiescence of Mr. Longworth, she asked her mother to tell her father
to report the matter to the Shelburne elders.
(b) The December 29, 1989 meeting
was set up by Mr. Palmer and it was he who invited the plaintiff to attend. Mr.
Cairns and Mr Brown did not know what the meeting was about and had no part in
compelling the plaintiff to attend. The process which led to the plaintiff’s
attendance at the December 29, 1987 meeting was put in place as a result of
advice given by Sheldon Longworth and Watch Tower that Matthew 18 applied. But
for this advice, Ms. Boer would not have attended. The meeting was
psychologically harmful to her
(c) The defendants did not instruct
the plaintiff not to get medical help. She chose not to seek professional help
herself against the advice of the elders and Mr. Mott-Trille.
(d) The defendants did not instruct
the plaintiff that her father’s abuse should not be reported. On the contrary,
the defendants directed Mr. Palmer to report himself to the C.A.S. and then
followed up directly to ensure he had done so.
(e) The Januay 31, 1990 meeting was
a Judicial Committee called to decide the appropriate sanction to be imposed
upon Mr. Palmer as a result of his sin. It was not an application of Matthew
18. There was no confrontation beetween the plaintiff and her father.
H. Failure to Report and Forbidding Medical Treatment
[100] The plaintiff’s claim against
the defendants includes two basis of liablility which are not viable based on
my factual findings.
[101]The plaintiff alleged the
defendants advised her not to seek medical treatment from a psychiatrist. I do
not need to decide any legal issues to deal with this aspect of her claim. I
have found on the facts that none of the defendants gave her such advice.
[102]The plaintiff also alleged that
she sustained harm as a result of the defendants’ failure to report her
father’s abuse to the appropriate authorities as required by law. I have
already noted above that it is not necessary for me to rule on the precise
extent of the reporting requirement in order to decide this case. It is also
unneccessary for me to decide whether, as a question of law, a delay in
reporting under the relevant legislation can support a cause of action in
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. I therefore will not do so.
[103] The defendants Brian Cairns
and Steve Brown first learned of the abuse on Decembaer 29, 1989. The abuse was
reported to the Childrens Aid Society in Orangeville (the office with
auathority extending to Shelblurne) in February 1990. It would appear that
representatives of the C.A.S. interviewed the plaintiff’s younger sister (who
was still a child) to ensure she had not been a victin and was in no danger.
The authorities were satisfied that no further steps needed to be taken. They
did not even speak to the plaintiff. Therefore there cannot have been any
damages to the plaintiff as a result of the delay in reporting between December
29, 1989 and February 5, 19990.
[104] Counsel for the plaintiff
argues that the Toronto elders had a duty to report, and that if they had
exercised that durty by reporting in Toronto C.A.S. authorities would have
intervened prior to the December 29, 1989 meeting and the plaintiff would have
been spared the trauma of the two confrontations with her father. There is no
factual foundation for that argument. There is no reason to believe the Toronto
office of the C.A.S. would have taken any steps whatsoever since the alleged
abuser lived outside the Toronto area as did anyone vulnerable to future abuse
at his hands. Ms. Boer was by then an adult and outside the jurisdictional
mandate of any Children’s Aid Society. Even if the Toronto office had decided
to intervene there is no reason to believe they would have handled the
situation any differently than the Orangeville office. In particular, there is
no evidence to establish that a report to the Toronto C.A.S. would have had any
impact on how the plaintiff was treated by the elders. Therefore even if there
was any liability for the delay in reporting, there is no causal link between
that conduct and any harm suffered by the plaintiff.
J. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
[105] The plaintiff claims damges
for breach of fiducuary duty based on the manner in which the defendants dealt
with her after she disclosed her father’s abuse. Her main focus is on the
‘confrontation” meetings with her father, which she alleges she only attended
because she was required to by the elders. She argues that forcing her to
attend these meetings was harmful to her and inconsistant with the fiducuiary
duty of the defendant to act in her best interests. There was also considerable
attention at trial to the aftermath within the Jehovah’s Witness community when
rumours circulated about the plaintiff’s allegations of abuse. The plaintiff
believes that the relatively insignificant punishment meted out to her father
led others in the community to believe she had made false allegations about
him. She also believes that members of the community blamed her somehow for the
internal struggles among the elders of the congregation. As a result of all
this, she felt she was shunned within the community which was also
psychologically harmful. Although it is not entirely clear to me whether this
is asserted as a basis for recovery of damges for breach of fiduciary duty, for
the sake of completedness I will deal with this as if it were.
[106] In assessing a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, the typical starting point is a consideration of the
nature of the relationship between the parties to determine if a fiduciary duty
arises. Upon concluding the defendant stands in a fiduciary relationship, one
would go on to consider the nature and extent of that duty, and only then,
whether it has been breached. In the case before me, I intend to approach from
the other direction. I consider first the following question: assuming there is
a fiduciary duty, can the conduct of any of the defendants be properly
characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty? In my view, it cannot. This
conclusion is fatal to the cause of action. It is therefore unnecessary for me
to decide whether there was a fiduciary responsibility between the defendants
and the plaintiff, or to resolve the far more complex question of the nature
and extent of such a responsibility in circumstances such as these where there
may be competing issues of religious freedom. The resolution of those issues is
better left to a situation where the disposition of the case requires it.
[107] The concept of fiduciary duty
is inextricably linked to principles of trust, loyalty, and good faith. In Fiduciary
Duties in Canada , looseleaf, (Toronto, Thomson Canada Ltd, 2000), Mark Ellis,
at p 1-1, seeking to defin “fiduciary”, cites the following words of Southin,
J.A. in Jostens Canada Ltd v. Gibsons Studio Ltd ., (1997) 99 B.C.A.C.
35, 162, W.A.C. 35,42, B.C.L.R. (3d) 149, (1998) 5 W.R.R. 403 (B.C.C.A.)at para
19:
The word itself (fiduciary) is of
Latin origin-from the noun “ fiducia ” meaning “trust” which is related
to the noun “ fidelitas ” from which we derive the word “fidelity”
through, if not a common descent, then association with the word “ fides ”
(faith) which turns up in the phrase “ bona fide ”, and which is itself
closely linked to the word “ fidere ” (to trust) which brings us back to
“ fiducia ”.
[108] Just as some element of trust
must be present before a relationship can be said to be fiduciary, so too there
must be some form of betrayal before there can be breach of fiduciary duty.
That does not mean that malice or bad faith must be shown in order to establish
breach of fiduciary duty, nor is it necessary in every case to show a personal
benefit to the fiduciary in order to find liability. However, simple negligence
by a fiduciary in carrying out his or her duties will not be sufficient to
constitute breach of fiduciary duty.
[109] This principle is
well-developed in cases involving the solicitor-and-client relationship. It has
long been recognized that a solicitor owes a fiduciary duty to his or her
client. However, not every act by a solicitor that causer harm to the client
can be properly characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty. In Fasken
Campbell Godfrey v. Seven-Up Canada Inc . (1997) 142 D.L.R. (4 th ) 456
(Ont. Gen. Div.) aff’d (2000) 182 D.L.R. (4 th ) 315 (Ont. C.A.), application
for leave to appeal dismissed. (2000) S.C.C.A. No. 143 the trial judge found at
page 483 that a failure to warn a client about a transaction was merely
negligence, not breach of fiduciary duty. To similar effect is the Ontario
Court of Appeals decision in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v. Bartlett and
Richardes (1996) 28 O.R. (3d) 768 (C.A.)in which Weiler J.A. stated at p.
774:
Although the professional
relationship between solicitor and client is of a fiduciary nature, many of the
tasks undertaken by a solicitor for a client may not involve a question of
trust and therefore do not attract a fiduciary obligation.
[110] In Girardet v Crease and Co
(1987) 11 B.C.L.R. (2 nd ) 361 (B.C.S.C.) Southin J. held:
“Fiduciary” comes from the Latin
“fiducia” meaning “trust”. Thus the adjective, “fiduciary”,means of or
pertaining to a trustee or a trusteeship. That a lawyer can commit a breach of
the special duty of a trustees, e.g., by stealing his client’s money, by
entering into a contract with a client without full disclosure, by sending a
bill claiming disbursements never made and so forth is clear . But to say
that simple carelessness in giving advice is such a breach is perversion of
words .The obligation of a solicitor of care and skill is the same
obligation of any person who undertakes for reward to carry out a task. One
would not assert of an engineer or a physician who had given bad advice and
from whom common law damages were sought that he was guilty of a breach of
fiduciaty duty. Why should it be said of a solicitor ? I make this point
because an allegataion of breach of fiduciaty duty carries with it the stench
of dishonestry-- if not of deceit then of constructive fraud . (Emphasis
added.)
Although this excerpt is from a
British Columbia trial court decision, I believe it accurately reflects the law
in Ontario. I note that Southin J’s statement of the law was specifically
appproved by the Supreme Court of Canada in Las Minerals v International
Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 both in LaForest J’s Majority
opinion at para. 147 and in Sopinka J’s partial dissent at para 31 as well as
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Bartlet ,
supra at p. 774
[111] There have been other
decisions from British Columbia courts which have applied similar principles
e.g . W.R.B. v Plint [2001] B.C.J. No. 1446 (S.C.) J.H. v. British
Columbia [1998] B.J.C. No 2926 (S.C.) and C.A. v. Chritchly [1998]
B.C.J. No. 2587 (C.A.) In C.A. v. Chritchly the British Columbia
government had contracted with the defendant Critchley to operate a wilderness
group home for troubled male youths, including the plaintiffs. Critchley
repeatedly physically and sexually abused the plaintiffs who had been entrusted
to his care. The court of appeal upheld trhe trial judge’s ruling that the
government was vicariously liable for Critchley’s torts. However, the court of
appeal reversed the trial judge’s finding that the government was itself in
breach of it’s fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs. McEachern C.J.B. C., writing
the lead decision reviewed the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on breach
of fiduciaty duty and concluded that such a finding should not be made “without
personal wrongdoing beyond possible carelessness or negligence” see paras
74-84. He then held,at para 85:
Applying this approach I conclude
that it would be a principled approach to confine recovery based upon fiduciary
duties to cases of the kind where, in addition to the other requirements such
as vulnerability and exercise of a discretion, the defendant personlly takes
advantgae of a relationship of trust or confidence of his or her direct or
indirect personal advantage . This excludes from the reach of fiduciary
duties many cases that can be resolved upon a tort or contract analysis, has
the advantage of greater certainty, and also protects honest persons doing
their best in difficult cidcumstances from the shame and stigma of disloyaltly
or dishonesty. (Emphasis added.)
[112] I agree with most of what Chief Justice McEachem said
on this topic in the Critchley case, although I would stop short of
requiring a direct or indirect personal advantage to the fiduciary in order to
constitute breach of fiduciary duty. The vast majority of cases in which breach
of fiduciary duty is established will involve some benefit to the fiduciary,
just as they will typically involve a detriment to the person to whom the duty
is owed. However, in my view, neither is an absolute requirement in order to
establish breach of fiduciary duty. What is required is conduct by the
fiduciary which is in some manner a betrayal of the trust relationsip.
Negligence in carrying out fiduciary obligations, while subject to redress
through tort or contract remedies, ought not to characterized as a breach of
the fiduciary duty without some element of betrayal or bad faith on the part of
the fiduciary. For example, suppose a trustee responsible for administering a
fund for the benefit of several beneficiaries distributes the fund unequally.
If the trustee does this deliberately, intending to benefit one beneficiary
over the others due to favoritism towards the one or animus towads the others,
that would be breach of fiduciary duty regardless of whether there was any
direct or indirect benefit to the trustree. However, if the unequal
distribution was due to an arithmetical error, this would merely be negligence,
not breach of fiduciary duty.
[113] Applying these principles to
the case before me, I find there was no breach of fiduciary duty by any of the
defendants. Assuming (without deciding) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, and assuming harm to the plaintiff from attending the two
meetings her father and her treatment by members of the congregation
thereafter, there was no element of betrayal or bad faiath on the part of any
of the defendants such as would make them liable for breach of fiduciary duty.
[114] I will deal first with the
first meeting on December 29, 1989. The plaintiffs position is that she only
attended this meeting because she was advised by Sheldon Longworth that she was
required to do so as part of the application of Matthew 18. Although Mr.
Longworth is not named as a defendant, the plaintiff argues that the defendants
Watch Tower and/or John Didur are responsible for the conduct of Mr. Longworth.
I have found as a fact that Mr. Longworth told the plaintiff she was required
to apply Matthew 18 in this siatuation. I have also found that Mr. Longworth’s
advice in this regard would appear to be contrary to the official position of
the church which is that Matthew 18 has no appplication to this type of sin.
However Mr. Longworth was sympathetic to the plaintiff and did not act out of
any self interest. He passed along to her what he honestly believed to be the
action required by the Scripture and by the Jehovah’s Witness faith. That was
the extent of his involvement. Likewise there is no evidence that the people at
head office advising Mr Longworth with anything but the best of intentions. I I
find as a fact that there was no element of breach of trust or bad faith on
their part. In my opinion even if the advice given to Ms. Boer which caused her
to attend the December 29, 1989 meeting was inaccurate or negligently given, it
cannot be characterized as breach of fiduciary duty.
[115] The December 29, 1989 meeting
was set up by Gower Palmer. Brian Cairns and Steve Brown did not know what the
December 29, 1989 meeting was about until after they arrived. They therefore
have no responsibility whatsoever for the fact that the plaintiff attended. The
plaintiff did not tell ahem she did not wish to be there, and she did not ask
to leave. They were sympathetic to her during the meeting. Nothing they did or
said in the course of that first meeting could be properly construed as breach
of fiduciary duty.
[116] Mssrs. Cairns and Brown did
set up the Judicial cCmmittee for January 30, 1990, not as a matter of person
al self-interest but rather in the course of their duties as elders of the
congregation in order to deal with the transgressions of a congregant. While
their actions have been hurtful to the plaintaiff, it cannot be said they acted
out of malice or in bad faith. They believed they were doing the right thing
and they did not simply ignore the plaintiffs intersts. For example, in the
second meeting, although they did review the allegations of abuse with the
plaintifff, they did not require her to go through that exercise with her
father present. Likewise the head office personnal advising the local elders
did nothing that could be characterized as disloyalty or bad faith.
Accordingly, I find no breach of fiduciary duty as a result of the Januatry 30,
1990 meeting.
[117] Mr. Cairns and Mr. Brown were
not responsible for spreading rumours about the plaintiff in the community.
They maintained the confidentiality of the information they had received. To
the extent there were problems among the elders, there is certainly no evidence
that either Mr. Cairns or Mr. Brown considered Ms. Boer to be in any way
responsible for that and no evidence that they ever communicated such a view to
others. There is no evidence that they shunned the plaintiff nor that they
instructed others to do so. Therefore even if the perception of others within
the congregation was as Ms. Boer describes (which also is not proven), thnere
is no basis for placing any blame for that at the feet of these defendants. Ms.
Boer is of the view that her father was dealt with too leniently by the
Judicial Committee and that this damaged her own reputation in the community. I
will not comment on whether the Judicial Committee made the right decision as
to the category of sin committed, the extent of Mr. Palmer’s repentance and the
appropriate sanctions for his spiritual wrongdoing. Those are matters far
beyond the purview of this court. However I do find as a fact that none of the
personal defendants was motivated by any ill will towards the plaintiff nor
bias in favour of her father. They acted sincerely and honestly in carrying our
their tasks as elders of the congregation. There was no element of bad faith.
There was no breach of fiduciary duty.
[118] In the result, therefore, the
plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciaty duty fails.
J. NEGLIGENCE
[119] The plaintiff also sues for
negligence. In order to establish a cause of action, she must show (i) that the
defendants owed her a duty of care (ii) that the defendants breached that duty
of care; (iii) that it was reasonably foreseeable she would be harmed as a
result and (iv) that she was in fact harmed.
(i) Position of the Parties
[120] The plaintiff argues that she
was dependent upon the various defendants because of her upbringing as a
Jehovah’s Wintess and that they would have known she felt she had no choice but
to follow their direction. She claims that the defendants were negligent in
directing her to confront her father and knew or ought to have known she would
be psycologically harmed by that process. She further argues that the
defendants’ handling of her father’s conduct within the congregation was
negligent and that this caused her additional harm.
[121] The defendants rely in the
constitutionally entrenched freedom of religion which they argue prevents any
civil liability from attaching to elders who have applied their religious
beliefs in accordance with their conscience. They deny the existence of any
duty of care in the course of pastoral counselling. They also point to the fact
that Vicki Boer was an adult when she voluntarily chose to participate in the
church’s process. The defendants further argue that their only responsibility
was to provide spiritual guidance and that the courts ought not to intervene in
matters involving theological principle and the imposition of religious
sanctions by the church. Alternatively, the defendants submit that their
actions did not fall below the applicable standard of care and, in any event,
caused no harm.
(ii) The American Approach: No
Tort of Clergy Malpractice
[122[ The defendants rely on a line
of cases in which American courts have refused to recognize a tort of clergy
malpractice. The American case law flows from the judicial interpretation of
the First Amendment to the Unitred States Constitution which provides, in part,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibit
the free exercise thereof.” These two clauses are known as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. American courts have held that the
Establishment Clause prohibits all forms of goverment action, including both
statutory law and court action. Any government or court activity which would
foster an excessive entanglement with religion runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause. Thus courts have held that civil tort claims aginst clerics that
require the courts to review and interpret church law policies or practices in
the determination of claims are barred by the First Amendment under the Entanglement
Doctrine. Franco v the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints 21
P. 3d 198 (Utah 2001) at p 203.
[123] Cases involving allegations
of negligence against clergy in carrying our their pastoral duties have
uniformly been dismissed as constituting a violation of the Establishment
Clause under the First Amendment. The courts have reasoned that determining the
nature and extent of the standard of care to be imposed on a member of the
clergy would require the courts to rule on the level of expertise normally
required of other similar members of that profession. According to the Supreme
Court of Utah in Franco supra at para 23:
This would embroil the courts in
establishing the training, skill and standards applicable for members of the
clergy in this state in a diversity of religions professing widely varying
beliefs. This is as impossible as it is unconstitutional; to do so would foster
an excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
[124] In Franco, a seven
year old girl had been sexually abused by a fourteen year old member of her
religious community. She represssed the memory, disclosing it for the first
time when she was fourrteen. She and her parents approached the bishop and the
president of their church who advised her to forgive, forget and seek
atonement. They asked for a referral to a registered mental health
professional, but were referred instead to someone they later learned was
unlicensed. The family then sought help from a qualified secular professional,
who reported the abuse to the police. As a result, the Franco family was
ostracized by the religious community. The Francos sued for clergy malpractice,
gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of
fiduciaty duty and fraud. All claims were dismissed summarily. With respect to
the alleged mishandling by church officials in the context of an ecclesiastical
counseling relationship, the Supreme Court held at p. 205 that these were all
related to alleged mishandling by church officials and hence were merely a
“roundabout way of alleging clergy malpractice”, which was barred by the First
Amendment.
[125] In Pritzlaff v
Archdiocese of Milwaukee 194 Wis. 2d 302; 533 N. W. 2dd 78 (1995) the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin dismissed the claims of a plaintiff who had been
sexually assaulted by a priest while she was a high school student. The claim
against the church was based on alleged neglience in hiring, training ,and
suervision of a priest who was a pedophile. The Supreme Court held at p. 236
that the First Amendment prevents a court from inquiring into what makes one
suitable to serve as a Catholic priest since “such a determination would
require interpretation of church canons and internal church policies and
practices”.
[126] In Schmidt v. Bishop ,
779 f Supp 32,1 (1991), the plaintiff sued the Presbyterian Church and one of
its pastors to whom her parents had sent her for emotional, spiritual, and
familial counselling when she was twelve years old. During the course of the
counselling the pastor sexually molested her. The United States Distsrict Court
for the Southern District of New York found that these facts would support an
action for battery or some other intentional tort. However, the limitation
period for such an action had expired. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s
claims framed in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty as against the pastor
and the church because of the difficultly in articulating the scope of the duty
owed or the standard of care without gettting into religious philosophy or
ecclessiastical teachings. The court said clergy members and churches could be
held liable for neglience arising outside pastoral duties e. g. driving the
Sunday School van but the court held that providing counselling to a member of
the congregation is a normal part of a pastor’s religious activities and hence
the First Amendment precludes liabiliaty for negligence.
[127] The defendants in the case
before me rely upon the decison of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Bryan
R. v. Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of New York (1999) M.E. 144.
When the plaintiff Bryan R. was an adolescent he was molested by an adult
member of his Jehovah’s Witness congregation, the defendant Baker. Some years
before Baker had molested another child in the community. At the time, he was
disciplined by the elders for his misdeeds, but later was permitted to resume
his activities as an ordinary member within the congegation. Bryan alleged that
the church and its elders were liable to him for negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty, arguing that manner in which the elders dealt with Baker’s
earlier transgressions and the elders’ failure to warn him about Baker made it
possible for Baker to obtain the plaintiff’s trust and to have the opportunity
to assault him. The plaintiff’s claims against the church and the elders were
dismissed. The court held there was no duty to protect members of the congregation
from the wrongdoing of others. Further, any effort to hold the church
responsible would require direct inquiry into the religious sanctions,
discipline, and terms of redemption or forgiveness that were available within
the church in the context of this claim, an inquiry that would require secular
investigation of matters that are almost entirely ecclesiastical in nature. Bryan
R . at para 27-28.
[128] The only American case to
which I have been referred which has recognized a cause of action in negligence
againsat a membrr of the clergy is Berry v Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society of New York , (1999) M.E. 144, a decision of the New Hampshire
Superior Court (Southern District) released on February 6, 2003 and brought to
my attention by counsel for the plaintiff while my decison in this case was
still under reserve. The plaintiff in Berry had been physically and
sexually abused by her stepfather in the 1980's when she was between three and
nine years old. The family belonged to the Jehovahs’ Witness chuch. The
plaintiff’s mother told the elders of their congregation on at least ten
occsions that her husband was abusing her children. The elders instructed the
mother to tell no one about the abuse or face potential disfellowshiping (being
ejected from the faith). At the time there was a requirement under New
Hampshire state law for ministers to report suspected cases of child abuse. The
plaintiff sued Watch Tower under various causes of action including a claim in
negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgement, contending that their
religious motivation for not reporting in accordance with statuatory law placed
them beyond civil reproach by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
[129] The New Hampshire Superior
Court held that the right to free exercise of religion does not operate to
relieve an individual from the obligation of complying with neural laws of
general application. Therefore the defendants could not rely on their rligious
views to excuse their failure to comply with the applicable child abuse
reporting statutes. Further, in dealing with the portion of the plaintiff’s
case founded in negligence, the court found the elders owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff even in the absence of direct privity. Groff J. held (at p. 12):
In this case, the plaintiff’s
mother sought the elders’ advice and counsel regarding the sexual abuse of her
children by her husband, a member of the congregation. The overwhelming risk of
harm to the plaintiff from the continuing abuse by her father and the magnitude
of that potential harm to her must necesssarily have been apprehended and
understood by any reasonable person. This rendered the elders’ conduct
unreasonably dangerous in view of the horrific consequences to the plaintiff by
not taking steps to report the abuse or properly counsel the plaintiffs mother.
The prevention of sexual abuse of
children is one of society’s greatest duties. In this case,to impose such a
duty places little burden upon the defendants. The burden requires only
common sense advice to the church member and a reporting of the abuse to the
authorities . Clearly the social importance of protecting the plaintiff
from her father’s continued brutal sexual abuse outweighs the importance of
immunizing the defendants from extended liabillity. The court finds that the
defendants did owe a duty of care to the plaintiff despite the absence of
privity berween them. Therefore the motion for summary judgment as to the
plaintiff’s cause of action in negligence is DENIED . (Emphasis added.)
[130] The court in the Berry case
referred briefly to the decision in Bryan R . but distinguished it on
its facts. With respect the Berry decision seems to me to be at odds
with the overwhelming trend in United States, which is to refuse to consider
any cause of action that would involve imposing a duty of care on a clegy
member engaged in any form of pastoral conduct, including counselling
congegation members. I also note that the court’s decision in Berry seems
to be based on a consideration of the Free Exercise Clause whereas most of the
other cases to which I have been directed turned on the Establishment Clause.
Given the extreme facts in Berry, in particular the clear breach of
the statuatory reporting requirement, I do not see Berry as authority
overriding the long-standing American case law. Accordingly, I conclude that
had Ms. Boer’s action been brought in the United States, it would likely be
subject to summary dismissal based on these cases.
( iii) The Canadian Approach: Balancing
Religious Freedon Against the Rights of Others
[131] As in the United States,
there is a strong tradition in Canadian law of protecting the fundamental right
of all persons to freedom of religion and conscience. Religious freedom is
specifically guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited under s. 15 of the
Charter, as well as under human rights legislation in all of the provinces and
in numerous other statutes.
[132] I accept the defendants’
position that protection of freedom of religion is an important factor to be
considered in this case. I also accept that the courts should generally be
reluctant to intervene in matters which are purely spiritual, particurarly
involving the discipline by the church of one of its members. Traditionally,
courts have refused to allow their process to be used for the enforcement of a
purely ecclesiastical decree or order, exercising civil jurisdiction only where
some property or civil right is affected thereby: Ukranian Greek Orthodox
Church of Canada v Ukranian Greek Orthodix Cathedral of St. Mary the
Proctectress [1940] S.C.R. 586; Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren
v. Hofer , [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165..
[133] However, Canadian courts have
held that freedom of religion is not absolute. Where the exercise of religious
beliefs adversely affects the rights of others, the courts can and will
intervene . R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, P. (D) v
S. (C ) [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141; Young v. Young [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3; B
(R) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315
.
[134] There are obviously many
similarities between the right tro freedom of religion in the United States and
the right to freedom of religion enshrined in the Canadian Constitution.
However, the Constitutional language is not identical and the same legal
analysis does not necessarily follow. In particular, American case law turning
on the interpretation of the Establishment Clause is not directly applicable in
the Canadian context. I was not referred to, and am not aware of, any Canadian
case which has considered the duty of care expected of a clergy member in
circumstances similar to the one before me. However, Canadian courts have not
been reluctnat to find a fiduciary relationship between a minister or priest
and a member of the congregation, provided the usual tests for the existance of
such a relationship are met. The fact that the relationship arises in a
religious setting has not been seen as a bar to imposing a fiduciary duty of
care. Deiwick v. Frid (1991) O.J. No. 1803 (Gen. Div.); W. K. v
Pornbacher (1997) B.C.J. No. 57 (B.C.S.C.)
[135] Similarly, the mere fact that
the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant arises in a religious
context is not a bar to there being a cause of action in negliegnce. W. K.
v Pornbacher, supra ; M.T. v. Poirier [1994] O.J. No. 1046 (Gen. Div.); F.S.M.
v. Clarke [1999] 11 W.W.R. 301 (B.C.S.C .); W.R.B. v. Plint [2001]
B.C.J. No. 1446 (S.C.)
[136] The Supreme Court of Canada
has consistently ruled that freedom of religion cannot be used to shield
conduct which harms others. In B (R) v. Children’s Aid Society, supra. the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld lower court rulings giving the Children’s Aid
Society authority to consent to blood transfusions for a young child after her
parents refused such treatment as being contrary to their religious beliefs as
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Iacobucci and Major, J.J. in a concurring opinion wrote in
that case at para. 226:
Just as there are limits to the
arnbit of freedom of exprression (eg s 2 (b) does not protect violent acts: R.
v. Zundel (1992) 2 S.C.R. 731, at pp. 753 and 801; R. v. Keegstra ,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 69,7 at pp. 732 and 830), so are there limits to the scope of
s. 2 (a), especially so when this provision is called upon to protect activity
that threatens the physical or psycological well being of others. In other
words, although the freedom of belief may be broad, the freedom to act upon
those beliefs is considerably narrower and it is the latter freedom at issue in
this case. The fact that “freedom” does not operate in a vacuum was underscored
by Dickson J. (as he then was) in his seminal decision in R. v. Big M. Drug
Mart Ltd . [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at p 337:
Freedom in a broad sense embraces
both the absence of coersion and constraint and the right to manifest beliefs
and practices. Freedom means that subject to such limitations as are necessary;
to protect public safety or health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his
beliefs or his conscience.
[137] Similaly, the majority
judgment in B (R) v. Children’s Aid Society case, delivered by
LaForest J. provides at para 107:
However, as the Court of Appeal
noted, freedom of religion is not absolute. While it is difficult to conceive
of any limitations on religious beliefs, the same cannot be said of religious
practices, notably when they impact on the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. The United States Supreme Court has come to a similar conclusion: see
Cantwell v Connecncut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd ,
supra this court observed that freedom of religion could be subjected
to “such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” p 337.
[138] In Young v Young and
P. (D.) v S. (C). supra , the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
parent’s religious activity can be restricted by the court when the activity is
against the child’s best interests, without the restriction infringing the
parent’s freedom of religion. As noted by McLachlin J. in Young v Young at
para 218
It is clear that conduct which
poses a risk of harm to the child would not be protected. As noted earlier,
religious expression and comment of a parent which is found to violate the best
interests of a child will often do so because it poses a risk of harm to the
child. If so it is clear that the guarantee of religious freedom can offer no
protrection.
[139] The leading cases in this
area have arisen when the religious values of parents have been found to be
harmful to children. However, there is no reason to restrict the principles
established in these cases to cases involving children. Laws, both statuatory
and common law, whose purpose is to protect the vulnerable cannot be thwarted
by a claim that the conduct harming the vulnerable person is permited or even
mandated by the perpetator’s religious convictions. In extreme situatuions,
such a restriction on religious freedom is necessary to prevent violence
against others in the name of religion. Further, I can see no principled reason
to restrict the protection to intentional torts; it should have equal
application to other causes of action such as negligence. My starting point,
therefore, is that a tort committed by a person in the course of what he or she
sincerely believes to be a religious duty is not automatically shielded from
scrutiny by the courts by operation of the constitutional protection for
freedom of religion. Where the rights of an individual are in conflict with the
religious freedom rights of another, the courts can, and will, balance the
competing rights in considering what, if any, remedy is appropriate.
[140] That is not to say that
courts are entitled to disregard issues of religious freedom entirely in
deciding cases of this nature. On the contrary, principles of religious freedom
will be integral to such decisions. However, the fact that a principle of
religious freedom may be involved will not necessarily be a bar to a litigant’s
right to a remedy before the courts. The extent to which the rights of the
individual will take priority over the principles of religious freedom will
depend on the circumstances of each case. As is demonstrated by the cases to
which I have referred above, courts will commonly favour the health and safety
of children over the religious values of their parents if their religious
practices are harmful to their children. The same would hold true for other
vulnerable persons who are harmed as a result of the religious beliefs of
others. The free will of competent adults to choose their own religious faith
must be recognized. Having chosen a particular religion, or voluntarily elected
to remain a member of it, a person will not be heard to complain later that he
was injured in some way as a result of the application of principles of that
faith. Likewise, matters of a purely internal nature such as membership or
discipline within a congregagion would rarely if ever be subject to review by
the courts. In each case the court must consider the nature of the religious
principle relied upon, the context in which it arises, the circumstances of the
person harmed, and the nature of the harm in the course of determining whether
the rights of the plaintiff shoudl be recognized notwithstanding the impact on
the religious freedom of the defendant.
(iv) Analysis: The December 29,
1989 Meeting
(a) Causation
[141] I have found as a fact that
the plaintiff attended the December 29, 1989 meeting because she had been told
by Sheldon Longworth that she was required to confront her father pursuant to
Matthew 18 15-18. I have also found that her attendancea at that meeting was
psychologically harmful to her. But for the advice given by Mr. Longworth, she
would not have attended. Thus there is a direct casual link between the advice
given by Mr. Longworth and the harm sustained by the plaintiff.
(b) Duty of Care
[142] The defendants acknowledge in
their written submissions that the test for determining whether a duty of care
exists in this type of situation involves the application of the classic rule
in Donohue v Stevenson . [1932] A.C. 532 (H.L.) at 580. I agree.
However, the Donohue v Stevenson test must also be considered within
the principles discussed in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978]
S.V. 728 [1977]. All E.R. 42 492 (H.L.) (“ Anns ”), as accepted by the
Supreme Court of Canada in City of Kamloops v Nielson et al (1984) 10
D.L.K. (4 th ) 641. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada released two decisions
which refined and clarified the application fo the anns test. Cooper v.
Hobart (2001), 206 D.L.R. (4 th ) 193, (“ Cooper ”); Edwards
v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2001) 206 D.L.R. (4 th ) 211 (“ Edwards
”). The approch to be applied is summarized in Edwards as follows
at paras 9-10:
At the first stage of the Anns test,
the questioin is whether the circumstances disclose reasonably foreseeable harm
and proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of care. The focus at
this stage is on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendants, including broad considerations of policy. The starting
point for this analysis is to dertermine whether there are analogous categories
of cases in which proximity has previously been recognized. If no such cases
exist, the question then becomes whether a new duty of care should be
recognized in the circumstances. Mere foreseeability is not enough to establish
a prima facie duty of care. The plaintiff must also show some proximity that
the defendant was in a close and direct relationship to him or her such that it
is just to impose a duty of care in the circumstances.
If the plaintiff is successful at
the first stage of Anns such that a prima facie duty has been
established (despite the fact that the proposed duty does not fall within an
already recognized category of recovery), the second stage of the Anns test
must be addressed. That question is whether there exist residual policy
considerations which justify denying liability. Residual policy considerations
include, among other things, the effect of recognizing that duty of care on
other legal obligations, its impact on the legal system and, in a less precise
but important consideration, the effect of imposing liability on society in
general.
[143] The first consideration is
whether there are analogous categories of cases where a duty of care has been
recognized. There have certainly been cases where a church or member of the
clergy has been found liable for negligence. However, these cases have tended
to arise where the church has been connected in some way to physical or sexual
abuse suffered by the plainfiff, e. g. failing to take action when
child abuse has been reported, failing to properly supervise or discipline
staff, or failing to have safeguards in place to prevent opoportunities for
child abuse; F.S.M. v. Clarke supra ; W.K. v. Pornbacher supra;
W.R.B. v Plint supra; M. T. versus Poirier (1994) O.J. No. 1045 (Gen.
Div.) I was not referred to and am not aware of any case in which a member of
the clergy functioning in a counseling capacity has been found to owe a duty of
care in negligence. However, there is one case in which a minister providing
counselling to a husband and wife was found to owe a fiduciary duy to them
(which he breached by having a sexual affaiar with the wife). Deiwick v.
Frid supra. There are also numerous examples of a duty of care being
applied to other types of counsellors, such as psychologists or social workers.
In my view these situations in which a duty of care has been found are
sufficiently similar to be considered analagous to the case before me, such
that a duty of care can be said to arise here without going any further in the Anns
analysis. However, since there are no cases directly in point and in the
event I have erred on this aspect of the test, it is appropriate to consider
all aspects of the Anns test before coming to a final conclusion on
whether there is a duty of care in this case.
[144] The second parat of the first
stage of the Anns test involves a consideration of proximity and
foreseeability in order to determine whether a new duty of care should be
recognized. In Coope,r the Supreme Court of Canada noted (at para 31)
that “proximity” is a term used to characterize the type of relationship in
which a duty of care may arise and that these relationships should be
identified through the use of categories. The catagory of relationshp in this
case would be that of a minster providing counselling and advice to a member of
his congregation who has come to him for help.
[145] In Cooper , the
Supreme Court quoted with favour the words of Lord Atkin, who observed in Donohue
v. Stevenson that proximity extends “to such close and direct relations
that the act complained of directly affects a person whom the person alleged to
be be bound to take care would know; would be directly affected by his careless
act”. Further, Lord Atkins held a duty is owed to “persons who are so closely
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts and
omissions which are called into question”: Cooper at para 32. The
Supreme Court of Canada said in Cooper that courts should look to
factors such as “expectations, reliance, represenatations and the property or
other interests involved” in evaluating the closeness of the relationship
betweeen the plaintiff and the defendant and in determining whether it is “just
and fair” to impose a duty of care in the defendant. Cooper at para
34.
[146] There is obviously a close
and direct relationship between a member of the clergy and a parishioner who
goes to him for advice. In that situation the clergyman would know that the
person seeking his advice would be directly affected by the advice he provides.
In providing that advice, he would clearly have his parishioner in his
contemplation as a person who would be affected by the advice he gives.
Counselling and providing advice to parishioners is part of the normal duties
of a member of the clergy. Further, clergymen are typically regarded by members
of their congregation as having a special status or position of authority. The
relationshiop is one of trust. The parishioner would to the knowledge of the
clergyman be likely to rely on him. It would be reasonable for the parisioner
to expect that the clergy members would exercise a reasonable degree of care in
dispensing advice. Because of the nature of this relationship, turning to one’s
minister for advice is fundamentally different from looking for advice from
friends or family. Given the direct relationship, it is easily foreseeable that
harm may befall the parishioner if the member of the clergy is negligent in
dealing with the matter before him. In my view, this situation is precisely the
kind of close and direct relationship in which courts have recognized it would
be just and fair to impose a duty of care on the person providing the advice.
Thus the first stage of the Anns test is met.
[147]The defendants submit that the
role of the elders in the case before me is closely akin to the pastoral
counselling referred to in F.S.M. v. Clarke [1999] 11 W.W.R. 301
(B.C.S.C.) and suggesst therefore that no duty of care ought to arise. In F.S.M.
v. Clarke , the trial judge Dillon J. imposed an onerous burden of care on
defendants who were various emanations of the Anglican Church. The plaintiff
had been sent to a residential school for native children when he was a child
and had been repeatedly sexually assaulted by Clarke, his dormitory supervisor,
while there. The school was operated by the Anglican Church, and was described
at para 7 as a “religious institution run with military precision” and, at para
171, as a “pervasive, purposeful Anglican environment controlled by an Anglican
administrator who was also a clergyman”. In this context at para 173, Dillon J.
imposed a duty on the Anglican Church to ensure a proper moral environment and
to care for known moral harm that might befall the plaintiff. The Anglican
Church was held liable for failing to properly supervise its employee Clarke,
thereby creating an environment in which Clarke could abuse the plaintiff.
Dillon J also found at para 182 that the Anglican Church furter breached its
duty in “failing to investigate properly and report Clarke’s sexual abuse after
it became directly known to them and in failing to provide any counselling or
care to F.S.M. afer the disclosure”. Dillon J. acknowledged at para 173 that
the “potential breadth of this duty might be unreasonably overwhelming” but
considered this appropriate when viewed “solely within the facts of this case
involving physical sexual abuse [sic]”. The reason for such a broad duty of
care was the closed nature of the society in which it arose. Dillon J. stated
at para 172:
This is not a situation of simple
pastoral counselling as occurs within a parish. F.S.M. was purposefully placed
in an institutional Anglican environment without access to outside influence in
order to further his religious educatuon. There is not the distance here seen
in regular contact between parishioner and clergyman where the parishioner
returns to home and the influence of others. Here the Anglcans undertook a role
to influence F.S.M.’s life fundamentally, with the expectation of his blind
obedience enforced by discipline. The Anglicans knew that an emotional
dependence would arise in the children at the school throuh the intimacy and
the pervasiveness of the relationship that was fostered between the children
and the adults directly responsible for their care.
'[148] I do not see F.S.M v.
Clarke as authority for the proposition that in a counselling relationship
berween a clergyman and congegant there can be no duty of care. On the contray,
the case confirms that whether a duty of care arises will depend on whether the
test defined in Donohue v. Stevenson has been met. In distinguishing a
situation of pasatoral counselling from a highly regimented residential school,
the court in F.S.M v. Clarke was dealing with the extent of the duty
of care to be imposed, not whether there was any duty of care at all. I agree
with Dillon J. in that case that the degree of conrol and domination exerted by
the defendants over the plaintiff is a fact to be taken into account in
determining the breadth of the duty of care to which the defendants will be
held. However the existence of such a degree of control is not a prerequisite
to the existence of a duty of care.
[149] Having recognized a prima
facie duty of care in this relationship, the second stage of the Anns test
requires the court to consider whether there are residual policy considerations
apart from the relationship itself which justify denying the existence of a
duty of care. Such considerations include, but are not limited to, whether
recognizing the duty would affect other legal obligations or the legal system
generally and whether recognizing a duty of care would raise the spectre of
liability to an indeterminate class of people. Cooper at para 37-39.
[150] The defendants argue that
societal interest in the protection of freedom of religion is contrary to the
imposition of a duty of care in this situatuion They further point to the
dificulty of imposing a duty of care where as here, the religious peson has a
conlict of interest as they are providing spiritual help to Mr. Palmer, Vicki
Boer and to the congregation at large.
[151] The fact that a duty of care
or differing duties may be owed to more than one person at the same time is not
in my view grounds for denying the existance of any duty of care at all. The
competing duties on a defendant may be factored into the standar of care to be
imposed or may be taken into account in determining whether there has been any
breach of the duty of care. However, I do not see this as compelling policy
reason for denying any duty of care.
[152] As I have already stated (at
paragraphs 131 to 140 above), protection of religous freedom does not mandate
the denial of any cause of action in negligence against a church or member of
the clergy. Principles of religious freedom may be taken into account in
determining, on a case by case basis, what standard of care should be imposed,
or whether any remedy is available. However, religious beliefs should not be an
absolute defence to conduct that is harmful to others. The implications of
denying any cause of action arising from negligent advice given by a chuch
official could be enormous. It would provide complete immunity for potentially
serious wrongdoing for which there might be no other remedy.
[153 Imposing a duty of care in the
circumstances before me would not open the floodgates of liability to an
indeterminate class of people any more than imposing a duty of care in a
doctor-patient or solicitor-client relationship would. This is a specific and
direct relationship between the clergly and a member of the congregation
seeking advice.
[154] Nor do I see any impediment
to recognizing a duty of care because of problems within the legal system
itself. I recognize the difficulty noted by rhe American courts in defining a
standard of care in cases involving negligence by church officials. However, I
do not see that as a reason for denying the existence of a duty of care
altogether. Courts are called upon to determine standards of care in many
complex situatuions e.g. the standard of care for a neurosurgeon in a teaching
hospital in a large urban center, or for a family medicine practitioner in a
remote area. The trial judge who makes such a decision is not meddling in
medicine or imposing the court’s will on medical matters. Rather the parties
call evidence from experts on the standard of care and the judge decides the
appropriate standard based on the wieght of the evidence. Although coming to
such a conclusion in a religious case is not without its difficulties, I do not
see it as a significant deparature from other cases routinely before the
courts.
[155] Neither do I consider it
beyond the ability of the court to determine whether a particular teaching or
principle is truly a tenet of a particular religion. Courts and tribunals are
often called upon to make similar determinations in discrimination cases,
labour cases, and wrongful dismissal actions where a particular course of
conduct or hiring decision is said to be required by the religion of the
employer or employee.
[156] I therefore conclude there is
no general policy reason to negate the prima facie duty of care arising in a
situation where a member of the clergy is providing aid and counseling to a
member of his congregation. The Anns taest is met. The next step is to
determine whether that duty of care arose in the case before me.
[157] In the Jehovah’s Witness
faith there is an even closer and more dependant relationsip between members of
the congregation and the clergy than is the case in most religions. For members
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, religion is a pervasive and dominant influence in
everyday life. Social contact with others outside the faith is discourged and
adherence to the instructuions of the elders is required. Although the
relationship between Ms. Boer and the elders of her congregation did not
involve quite the same degree of control and dependancy as described by the
court in F.S.M v. Clarke , neither was it a mere counseling
relationship beween minister and parishioner where the parishioner returns home
to the influence of family and others. Many of the aspects of dependency noted
by Dillon J. in F. S .M v. Clarke were also present here e. g. a
closed society isolated from outside influence, the pervasive nature of the
religious influence , and the requirement of blind obedience. It was within
this context that the relationship between the plaintaiff and the defendant
arose. Vicki Boer went to Sheldon Longworth because she was troubled and needed
advice. She barely knew him. She consulted him solely in his capacity as an
elder of her faith. She had been raised in her faith to put her complete trust
in the elders. Obedience was required. To the knowledge of the elders and Watch
Tower, she relied entirely upon the advice she was given and felt she had no
option but to comply. Mr. Longworth was fully aware of her vulnerable emotional
state. He was also aware that she dreaded the confrontation with her father,
which he counselled her was required in this situation. There was a close and
direct relationship between and elders and the plaintaiff in which there was
every expectation that she would rely upon and follow the adcice she was given.
Further, given her emotional state, it was readily foreseable that the course
of action recommended would likely cause further emotional harm to the
plainatiff, the very type of harm which did occur. In these circumstances I
find that a duty of care did arise as between the elders and the plainfiff.
( c) Religious Freedom of the
Defendants and the Plaintiff’s Free Choice
[158] The defendants submit that
the plaintiff was an adult in December 1989, when she voluntarily came to the
elders seeking their intervention. She wanted the elders to be aware of her
father’s sin and wanted them to deal with it within the principles of the Jehovah’
Witness faith. They argue that since she came to the church seeking a religious
solution she cannot fault the church elders for having dealt with the matter as
required by atheir faith. They point out she was not compelled to attend the
December 29th meeting; rather, she freely chose to attend.
[159] There are two fundamental
difficulties withn the defendants’ analysis. First, the matter was not dealt
with as required by their religion. The evidence at trial was clear that
Matthew 18 has no application and that there is no requirement of the Jehovah’s
Witness faith that the victim of sexual abuse must confront her abuser and give
him an opportunity to repent. Second, in all of the circumstances I do not see
the plaintiff’s attendance at that meeting as exercise of free will on her
part. I will deal with both points in more detail.
[160] First of all, there is
considerable merit to the argument that if a competent adult does not agree
with her religion’s position on a given topic, she has two choices: (I) she can
choose to follow the church teaching because she wishes above all to remain a
member of the faith; or (ii) she can leave the religion. Having freely chosen
to stay in the religion and accept its principles, she cannot later complain
that she has suffered harm as a result of her own decision. But can a person be
said to be responsible for her own harm having freely chosen to follow her
faith, when in fact the harm she sustained was not required by that faith? An
example is illustrative. Suppose a member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith is
considering surgery and asks an elder if Jehovah’s Witnesses are permitted to
have blood transfusions. She is told, accurately, that this is not permitted
within the Jehovah’s Witness faith. Having considered the matter, she decides
not to have a transfusion and sustains harm as a result. She has exercised free
choice, deciding to follow the teachings of her religion rather than the advice
of her medical doctor.
Next, suppose that a member of the
Anglican Church faced with the same surgery asks her minister if Anglicans are
permitted to have blood trasnfusions. In fact there is nothing in the Anglican
faith to prevent blood transfusions. However, the minister gives his
parishioner the wrong information and tells her blood transfusions are
forbidden for Anglicans. Rather than give up her religion and trusting the
advice of her minister, she elects not to have the transfusion and is harmed.
Can the second woman be said to have exercised free choice in the same manner
as the first? I think not. The source of the second woman’s harm is not her
choice to follow the teachings of her religion but rather her reliance on the
incorrect advice of her minister.
[161] The plaintiff in the case
before me is in the position of the second woman in my example. Vicki Boer
believed that she was required to apply Matthew 18 in this situation. She was
told this by Mr. Longworth to whom she had turned for help and advice. It is
not fully clear whether Mr. Longworth misunderstood the advice he received from
head office, or whether the advice given by head office was precisely what Mr.
Longworth conveyed to the plaintiff. What is clear is that the advice he gave
to the plaintiff was wrong. It was therefore the incorrect advice given to the
plaintiff that caused her to atttend that meeting, not her free choice to
follow a principle of her religion. The harm she sustained flowed from her
reliance on the incorrect advice provided by Watch Tower through Mr. Longworth.
It was not caused by any actual requirement of her religion. Ironically, in an
action focused so extensively on principles of religious freedom, on the actual
facts of the case there was no issue of religious freedom involved. It was all
a mistake.
[162] The second difficulty I have
with the defendants’ position is that it is valid only if the plaintiff’s
decision to attend the December 29, 1989 meeting was truly an exercise of free
will. The plaintiff says she was forced to attend the meeting by the elders
whereas the defendants say she chose to attend. In my view this situation is
directly analogous to one in which the defence of consent is asserted.
[163] In December 1989, Vicki Boer
was a mentally competent adult person legally capable of making her own
decisions. In the absence of factors traditionally seen as vitiating consent
(such as force, threat of force, or fraud), she is presumed to have attended
the December 29th meeting as an exercise of autonomy and free will. However,
the analysis of whether there has been genuine consent on her part does not end
there. To determine whether the consent is genuine, one must also consider the
power relationship between the parties and in partricular whether one party had
the power to dominate and influence the other. Norberg v. Wynrib [1992]
2 S.C.R. 226 at pp 246-261.
[164] In . Norberg v. Wynrib the
defendant was the plaintiff’s doctor. Dr Wynrib was aware his patient was
addicted to drugs. He offered to continue prescribing those drugs for her in
exchange for sexual favours. At firstr she refused. However, after her other
sources for obtaining the drugs dried up, she reeturned to Dr. Wynrib and
agreed to his proposition. Years later she sued Dr. Wynrib, asserting, among
other things, the tort of battery and breach of fiduciary duty. Dr. Wynrib
argued that Ms. Norberg had consented to the sexual activity. At the Supreme
Court of Canada, a panel of six judges all ruled in favour of Ms. Norberg for
differing reasons. Two of the six judges (McLachlin and L’ Heureux-Dube JJ)
decided the case based on breach of fiduciary duty without reference to the
issue of the defence of consent or the tort of battery. Of the remaining four
judges, three (LaForest, Gonthier and Cory, JJ) held that Dr. Wynrib’s conduct
constituted battery. Refecting the defence of consent in the circumstances the
sixth judge, Sopinka J, joind in Ms. Norberg’s favour based on breach of
contract. Sopinka J considered the battery claim but was of the view that the
defence of consent had been established on the facts. Thus three of the four
judges dealing with the issue found there was no consent.
[165]LaForest J delivered the
judgement of the three judges whose decision was based on the tort of battery.
He first noted, at p 247 that the presumption of individual will and autonomy
is “untenable in certain circumstances”. In particular, “a postion of relative
weakness” can interfere with free choice. He therefore concluded that “Our
notion of consent must be modified to appreciate the power relationship between
the parties.” Having considered the parallels between this approach to consent
and the concept of unconscionability of contract law, LaForest stated, at p
250:
It may be argued that an unconscionable
transaction does not in fact vitiate consent: the weaker party retains the
power to have real consent but the law nevertheless provides relief based on
social policy. In the same way, in certain situations, principles of public
policy will negate the legal effectiveness of consent in the context of sexual
assault. In particular, in certain circumstances, consent will be considered
legally ineffective if it can be shown that there was such a disparity in the
relative positions of the parties that the weaker party was not in a position
to choose freely. (Emphasis added.)
[166] LaFoarest J went on to
consider the impact of special relationships, concluding that relationships
where one party has power and authority over another are more likely to attract
scrutiny in determining whether consent by the weaker party is genuine. He
concluded that consent to a sexual relationship in such circumstances is
inherently suspect, referring to an article by Professor Phyllis Coleman as
follows at p. 255:
An ability to dominate and
influence is not restricted to the student-teacher relationship. Professor
Coleman outlines a number of situations which she calls “power dependency”
relationships: see Coleman, Sex in Power Dependancy Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the Fair Sex (1998), 53 Alb.L.Rev .95. Included in these
relationships are parent-child, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, clergy-penitent
, professor-student, attorney-client, and employer-employee. (Emphasis
added).
[167] In applying these principles
to the situatuion between Ms. Norberg and Dr. Wynrib, the three majority judges
on this issue held that she had not freely consented to the sexual activity. In
coming to that conclsuion, at p 257, LaForest J noted the “marked inequality in
the respective power of rhe parties”, the fact that Ms. Norberg was a young
woman with limited education, the fact that her need for drugs placed her in a
vulnerable position, and the fact that this vulnerability was known to and
exploited by Dr. Wynrib.
[168] Sopinka J disagreed with the
conclusion reached by his three fellow judges and would have held on the facts
that Ms. Norberg had consented to the sexual activity involved. He agreed that
in determining the existence of factors tending to negate consent, it is
necessary to take a “contextually sensitive approach”. This, he stated, should
be done on a case-by-case basis rather than establishing catagories of
relationships in which consent to sexual conduct would rarely be accepted as genuine.
However, he stated at p. 304 “certain relationships, especially those in which
there is a significant imbalance in power or those involving a high degree of
trust and confidence, may require the trier of fact to be particularly careful
in assessing the reality of consent.”
[169] Before returning to the
application of these principles to the case before me, it is relevant to
consider the observations of the trial judge in F.M.S. v. Clarke, supra ,
in particuar the excerpt I have quoted at paragraph [149] above. Dillon J was
dealing at that point with the breadth of the duty of care to be imposed.
However, the point made has equal application to a consideration of the
relationship between the parties in the course of deciding whether there has
been an exercise of free will. Dillon J noted the difference between a
situation of “simple pastoral counselling as occurs within a parish”, and a
totally closed society in which the religious influence is “pervasive” and
“blind obedience” expected of the members. Those are useful distinctions to
bear in mind in considering the situation of Vicki Boer and the elders of her
faith.
[170] In my opinion, the power
dependency relationship between Vicky Boer and the elders of the Jehovah’s
Witness faith in 1989 was such that she cannot be said to have exercised free
will in respect of directions given by the elders. Although she was legally of
the age of majority, having turned nineteen in November 1989, Vicki Boer was a
naive and unsophisticated young woman who had led a sheltered life to that
point. Furthermore, it was a life dominated by the influence of the Jehova’s
Witness faith. She had been forbidden to develop relationships with anyone
outside the faith and had been trained to obey the elders without question. Up
untill a few months before, she had lived at home with her family in a rigidly
religious household and within a small community in which everything in her
life centered on her religion. Refusal to follow the direction of the elders
was not an option if she wished to stay within her religion; and abandoning her
religion would also constitute an abandonment of her family, friends and
communty at a time in her life when she was emotionally dependent and fragile.
Disobeying the elders was literallly inconceivable to the plaintiff at the
time.
[171] As I have noted above, the
relationship between Ms. Boer and the Jehovah’s Witness elders was not as
dependent as was the case with the children in the residential school in F.S.M
v. Clarke, supra . However it was far closer to that sort of closed
society than would be the case in the usual situation of a parishioner having
regular contact with a clergy man but returning to home and the influence of
others at other times. That is because of the pervasive nature of the Jehovah’s
Witness religion’s presence in the everyday lives of its adherents the specific
religious requirement of obedience, and the direction to avoid wordly ways and
social interaction outside the faith.
[172] The plaintiff’s dependence
and powerlessness developed as a direct result of the teachings of the
defendant Watch Tower. She was brought up in that faith to accept the word of
the elders unquestioningly. Independent thought was not permitted. She was
taught not to trust anyone outside the faith and she followed that direction.
Thus, when her employers noticed her distress in December 1989 and asked if
they could help, she rebuffed their efforts, insisting that only somebody
within her religion could help her. The elders were, therefore, not only aware
of her dependence and vulnerability, they were responsible for it.
[173] In my view there is a direct
parallel between the relationship between the doctor and patient in Norberg
v. Wynrib, supra , and the relationship between tae elders of the
Jehovah’s Witness and Ms. Boer. Certainly the conduct of Dr. Wynrib was more
represehsible than anything done by the defendants here and the element of
exploitation of the relationship for personal advantage by Dr. Wynrib is
missing in this case. On the other hand, the degree of control that the
Jehovah’s Witness elders were able to exert over Ms. Boer was, if anything,
more ingrained and pervasive than was the case for Dr. Wynrib. In both cases
the powerful party was aware of the dependency and involved in its
continuation: the Jehovah’s Witnesses as part of their religious belief system
and Dr.Wynrib because he took no steps to cure his patient’s addiction.
[174] The defendants called
evidence on this point from Dr. Daniel Silver, a psychiatrist who examined the
plaintiff at the request of defence counsel. He testified that the plaintiff at
the age of nineteen was not submissive or passive. Rather, he described her as
strong- willed and rebellious. From my earlier conclusions about the plaintiff’s
relationship to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, it follows that I do not accept the
evidence of Dr. Silver on this point. Dr. Silver’s opinion was based on what he
thought to be the plaintiff’s behaviour at the time. However, the instances of
rebellious behaviour he noted were all incidents that occurred after February
1990, after the time when she had begun to feel abandoned and mistreated by her
own religion. He was also under the incorrect impression that the tensions
between Ms. Boer and the church had been going on for some time before December
1989. Nobody who knew Ms. Boer in December 1989, described her as rebellious.
Those who knew her, including some of the defendants, described her as
committed to her religion and as a quiet, somewhat shy young woman. Dr.
Silver’s opinion that the plaintiff was not forced to participate in the two
meetings but rather chose to do so is based on a mistaken apprehension of the
facts and therefore I do not find it to be persuasive
[175] Accordingly I conclude that
holding the defendants to a duty of care in this situatuion does not interfere
with their religious freedom. Further, by attending the meeting on December 29,
1989, the plaintiff was not truly exercising a free choice to follow her
religion and is not therefore prevented from asserting this cause of action.
(d) Standard of Care and Breach
[176] There was no evidence of the
particular standard of care applicable to elders of the Jehovah’s Witness faith
in this community at the relevant time. I agree with the defendants’ submission
that the standard of care applicable to psychiatrists, psychologists, or social
workers is not the appropriate standard against which to measure the conduct of
the elders. In the absence of specific evidence as to the standard, it is
appropriate to apply the general standard of care for negligence, that of a
reasonable person in like circumstances. The elders in this situation had no
particular expertise dealing with victims of childhood sexual abuse. They cannot
be expected to be familiar with the literture on how to handle disclosure of
abuse by vulnerable victims. However, as a matter of the general knowledge any
person in the community would be expected to have in 1989, the defendants must
have known that being a victim of sexual abuse is traumatic and for any such
victim to confront her abuser about such conduct in front of others would also
likely be emotionally difficult. It was reasonably foreseeable that such a
confrontation could be emotionally harmful to the plaintiff.
[177] The particular elders
involved in counselling Ms. Boer also had specific information about her
emotional circumstances. They knew she was already beginning to have emotional
problems arising from her father’ abuse and they knew, because she specifically
told them,that she was terrified about having to confront her father in the
manner they directed. Fixed with that knowledge, and aware of their own lack of
expertise, it was incumbent upon the elders to make inquiries of a professional
as to how the potential harm to the plaintiff could be minimized, if not
avoided entirely. In my opinion failure to take this very basic precaution was
a breach of the standard of care. Further, the elders in Toronto could at least
have warned the elders in Shelburne of the nature of the situation and the
vulnerability of Ms. Boer so that an attempt could be made to minimize the risk
of harm to the plaintiff. Instead they took no steps whatsoever to speak with
their Shelburne counterparts, with the result that Messrs. Cairns and Brown
walked into the meeting blind, unaware of what would be discussed and unaware
of the plaintiff’s emotional difficulty . Again in my view, this falls below
the appropriate standard of care. Had the Shelburne elders been aware of the
situation, it is likely they would have heard from the plaintiff in the absence
of her father just as they had done for the January 31, 1990 meeting. Furher,
given that the advice with respect to Matthew 18 was incorrect, there is a good
chance this could have been avoided altogether if there had been better
communication between the two groups of elders.
[178] Accordingly I find that the
plaintiff was obliged to go through the difficult and traumatic experience of
confronting her father about his past sexual abuse in front of her father and
two elders of the community. Although the plaintiff knew this confrontation
would be harmful to her, she felt she had no choice but to comply. Further,
because of her religious upbringing and the requirements of her religion , she
was powerless and dependent upon the elders. She cannot be regarded as having
chosen of her own free will to attend the meeting. She attended the meeting due
to the incorrect advice given to her by the elders in Toronto as to the requirements
of her faith. Further, although the Totonto elders were aware this experience
would likely be traumatic for her, they failed to take reasonable steps to
avoid that harm, such as obtaining competent expert advice or,at the very
least, advising the elders in Shelburne of the situation they would be facing.
Had they taken these reasonable steps, the harm to the plaintiff arising fron
the December 29, 1989 meeting would likely have been averted. I therefore find
that the requisite elements for a cause of action in negligence are
established. The next question is which, if any, of the defendants are liable
for damages arising from the negligence that caused the plaintiff to attend the
December 29, 1989 meeting.
(e) The Individual Defendants
[179] The defendants Steve Brown
and Brian Cairns were completely unaware of the subject matter of the December
2,9 2989 meeting prior to actually hearing it from Mr. Palmer and the
plaintiff. They heard from the family members present, made some inquiries to
satisfy themselves that the younger children were not in danger, and told the
Palmers they would get back to them about what needed to be done. Neither Mr.
Brown nor Mr. Cairns was responsible for the structure of the meeting. They had
no knowledge that Matthew 18 was being applied. The plaintiff did not tell them
that she did not want to be there and she did not ask, nor attempt, to leave.
Under these circumstances neither Mr. Brown nor Mr. Cairns is responsible for
any harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the meeting. I have already
determined that there is no liability arising from any of their conduct
subsquent to the December 29 meeting.
[180] John Didur is a personal
dedendant. He testified at trial that Matthew 18: 15-18 has no application to
this type of situatuion and that he would never have told this to Sheldon
Longworth. Mr. Longworth’s notes of one of his conversations with Mr. Didur
indicate that Mr. Didur told him that Matthew 18 applied. It is also apparent
from his notes that Mr. Longworth spoke to other advisers at head office and
that at least one other elder told him Matthew 18 applied. Mr. Longworth’s
specific memory of which elders provided which advice is not reliable, as he
candidly acknowledged in his testimony. It is possible Mr. Didur gave such
advice without fully appreciating the background circumstances. It is also
possible Mr. Longworth was confused about the advice he received from Mr. Didur
or that he inaccurately recorded the discussion as having been with Mr. Didur
when it was in fact with someone else. I found Mr. Didur to be a convincing
witness. I am not able to say on a balance of probabilities that he was the one
who told Mr. Longworth to apply Matthew 18: 15-18. Therefore he is not
personally liable in damages to the plaintiff in respect of the December 29,
1989 meeting.
( 1 ) The Defendant Watchtower
Bible and Tract Society of Canada
[181] Sheldon Longworth is not
named as a personal defendant. However, Ms Boer contacted Mr . Longworth in his
capacity as an elder of the church. Mr. Longworth consulted throughout with
more senior advisers at the Jehovah’s Witness head office and passed on their
advice to the plaintiff. He acted at all times as an agent of the defendant
Watch Tower. The defendant Watch Tower did not seek to distance itself from the
conduct of Longworth and the other elders who provided advice to Ms. Boer in
Toronto or to disclaim any responsibility for their actions. Although the
statement of claimcould be clearer on this point, I believe that on a fair
reading of the pleading and subsesquently delivered particulars, there is an
allegation that Watch Tower is responsible for the harm suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the direction given to her to apply Matthew 18:15-18.
Accordingly I find the defendant Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Canada
liable to the plaintiff for the harm she sustained as a result of attending the
Decemer 29, 1989 meeting.
( v) Analysis: The January 31
1990, Committee Meeting
[182] The January 31, 1990 Judicial
Committee meeting was called to consider the appropriate sanctions, if any, to
be imposed upon Mr. Palmer for his transgressions. The decision as to whether a
committee was appropriate is not something this court should interfere with. This
is akin to a quasi-judicial function. No duty of care would be owed to Ms. Boer
in connection with the decision itself. However, the manner in which the
meeting was conducted could potentially give rise to a duty of care since Ms.
Boer was dirctly involved and there was a reasonable expectation of the part of
the three commitee members that she would find the meeting emotionally
difficult. However, in my view the three committee members acted reasonably in
the manner in which they conducted the Judicial Committee meeting. They were
careful to ensure the plaintiff felt she was being listened to and believed,
and they met separately with plaintiff to hear her story so as to spare her the
difficulty of going over the details in ront of her father. I find no breach of
any duty o; care bh the defendants in connection with the Judicial Committee
meeting and hence no liability agaisnt any of the defendatns arising from it.
( vi) Analysis: The Church’s
Handling of Mr. Palmer’s Abuse and Events After January 1990
[183] Having heard the particulars
of Mr. Palmers conduct and considered the applicable Scriptures, the three
elders who constituted the Judicial Committee that had been struck to consider
the matter made a decision as to what they thought was an appropriate sanction.
In coming to that decision they considered and applied what they believed to be
the principles of their faith. There is no evidence that any of the defendants
communicated the circumstances of the situation inappropriately to others. They
took no steps directly against the plaintiff and were not responsible directly
or indirectly for gossip in the community or for any actual or perceived
shunning of thte plaintiff by members of the congregation. The discipline by a
church of one of it own members is an area upon which courts are very reluctant
to intrude. That is particularly so when as here the plaintiff was not the one
being disciplined and alleged only indirect harm. In my opinion neither the
elders nor the church owed a duty of care to the plaintiff in these
circumstances. The nature of the discipline to be imposed on Mr. Palmer was
purely a matter between the church officials and Mr. Palmer. The plaintiff had
no privity and was owed no duty. Further, there was no reasonable expectation
that she would be harmed by any sanction imposed on Mr. Palmer. Even if there
was a duty owed there was no breach by any of the defendants that could be said
to cause damage to Ms. Boer. Therefore, there is no liibtity on any defendant for
anything that happened after the January 31, 1990 Judicial Committee meeting.
K. DAMAGES
[184] It follows from the above
that the only harm suffered by the plaintiff for which any defendant is in law
responsible is the harm arising from her participation in the December 29, 1989
meeting. The only defendant liable in damages for that harm is Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society of Canada. The final question to be determined is the
quantum of the plaintiffs damages.
[185] The plaintiff relies upon the
evidence of Dr. George Awad, a psychiatrist. He is not a treating psychiatrist
but examined the plaintiff at the request of her counsel for the purposes of
this litigation. Dr. Awad testified Ms. Boer suffers from a generalized anxiety
disorder, which is long term and will require many years of psychotherapy to
treat. He noted she has many of the symptoms of survivors of childhood sexual
abuse and agreed many of her symptoms stem directly from the trauma of being
sexually assaulted by her father. However, Dr. Awad placed great emphasis on
the manner in which the Jehovah’s Witness elders handled the situation once the
abuse was reported to them. He described them as being “insensitive” from the
outset and said that the way the church handled the matter was a factor
preventing her recovery from the initial trauma of her father’s abuse. Further,
he specificaly referred to the requirement of her confronting her father in
front of the elders and other forced repetitions of her story and said this
exacerbated the original trauma with effecfts even more severe than the sexual
abuse itself.
[186] The plaintiff also filed
reports from several health care professionals who she has seen for treatment
for brief periods over the intervening years. These included a one page letter
from a counselor, Russell Scott, who saw Ms. Boer for a 1 1/2 hour counselling
session in October 1997. In the letter Mr. Scott confirmed his advice to Ms.
Boer that some of her dificulties “may be related to the fact she was raised in
a cult environment” Mr. Scott further stated that the strategy of requiring Ms.
Boer to confront her father in front of the elders caused far reaching
emotional damage and was re-traumatizing. Dr. Helene Daigle, a psycholgist who
saw the plaintiff for treatment in January 1998, described her as suffering
from symptoms of “excessive anxiety, lack of trust in others and herself and
confusion”. She stated that Ms. Boer would have benefitted from getting
professional help when she revealed the abuse and this could have spared her
years of excessive guilt, fear, and confusion.
[187]The diagnosis of the
plaintiff’s current psychological difficulties by the defence expert, Dr.
Silver, is remarkably similar in many respects to the opinions of the experts
relied upon by the plaintiff. He agreed that she suffers from anxiety and many
symptoms of post traumatic stress. He was further of the view that she
struggles with a personality disorder which includeds attempts to avoid real or
imagined abandonment, difficult interpersonal relationships, feelings of
emptiness, and impulsivity. Where Dr. Silver differed significantly with Dr.
Awad is in respect of the cause of the plaintiff’s psychological difficulties.
He accepted that it was emotionally difficult for the plaintiff to go through
the December 29, 1989 meeting and confront her father about his abuse. However,
in his opinion the sexual abuse by her father when the plaintiff was at a most
vulnerable adolescent age was the most important causal event leading to her
later emotional difficulties. Dr Silver also referred to other sources of the
plaintaiff’s anxiety, such as failed roamantic relationships, her difficulties
with her mother difficulties arising from her split with her religion, and
loneliness as a young wife and mother with her husband away for extended
periods of time. Dr. Silver agreed that the processs of confronting her father
would likely have caused the plainifff grief and anxiety and would have
re-evoked the trauma of the original abuse. However, he also testified that the
plaintiff was very strong-willed and that if she found the experience of
repeating her story to be really traumatic, she could not have been “dragged”
to the meeting. He testified that she unconscioulsy needed to repeat the
original abusive trauma sufferd as a result of her father’s abuse by repeating
her story over and over. Dr. Silver disagreed strongly with Dr Awad’s opinion
that the trauma of the December 29, 1989 confrontation meeting was worse than
the origianl sexual abuse. Dr. Silver testified that the impact of the
confrontation was negliglible or insignificanat when compared to the horrendous
trauma of the original sexual abuse. He said it was like comparing a malignant
tumour to a benign boil.
[188] Dr. Silver testified that the
plaintiff appeared to feel a great deal of rage towards her father which he
found to be understandable. However, she aslo demonstrated a desire to preserve
her own good image of her parents. Dr. Silver believes the plaintiff had displaced
her rage against her father by directing it against the Church; that she has a
need to split things into good and bad with her parents perceived as good and
the Church as bad.
189] As I have already noted above
(at paragraph 176) I do not accept Dr. Silver’s opinion with respect to the
plaintiff being strong-willed and rebellious in 1989. His conclusion in that
regard is based on a misapprehension of some of the evidence. To the extent his
conclusions as to the minimal traumatic impact of the Decemer 29, 1989 meeting
are influenced by his belief that the plaintiff attended that meeting
willingly, his opinion must be looked at critically and carefully. However, I
found the balance of Dr. Silver’s evidence to be even-handed and thoughtful.
[190] Dr. Awad’s evidence must also
be considered carefully because it is premised on the accuracy of the
plaintiff’s evidence as to how the events of December 1989 and January 1990
transpired. As I have stated above, many of the plaintiff’s beliefs as to the way
in which she was treated by the elders are inaccurate. Dr. Awad understandably
accepted the accuracy of the plaintiff’s recollection for the purpose of
reaching his opinion. The inaccuracy of the factual underpinning for his
opinion seriously undermines its weight. Further, I found Dr. Awad to be almost
adversarial in his support for the plaintiff’s cause during the course of his
testimony. In his written report delivered in August 1999, Dr. Awad described
the elders as being hostile, unfeeling, and judgemental. His report recognizes
the trauma of the original abuse and its likelihood of longtime sequalae. He
describes the confrontation meeting and the forced re-telling of the
plaintiff’s staory as re-traumatizing and says it “made the situation worse”(page
11) and that “the way this case was handled increased the anguish and suffering
that Mrs. Boer experienced” (page 12).
[191] At trial Dr. Awad went
considerably further. In examination in chief, Dr. Awad stated that Ms. Boer’s
current anxiety stems from earlier trauma in part because of the sexual abuse
but “mostly” because of the way it was handled by the elders. On
cross-examination, Dr. Awad stated at one point that it was a “toss up” as to
which was more traumatic, the original sexual abuse or the way it was handled
by the elders, but that if he had to choose he woulds say the Church’s handling
of the matter was worse than the original trauma. Later he said that although
the plaintiff was upset by the sexual abuse he was not sure she was psychiatrically
disturbed by it. According to him it was the re-traumatizatian by the elders
that did the real damage.
[192] As I have already noted there
are difficulties with the evidence of both experts who testified. However, I
found the evidence of Dr. Silver to be more balanced and impartrial than that
of Dr. Awad. I accept Dr. Silver’s opinion that Dr. Awad failed to give
sufficient weight to the obvious trauma caused by the sexual abuse. Ms. Boer
had already started to experience disturbing symptoms stemming from her
father’s abuse before the elders were even involved. Many of her symptoms in
later life were clearly related to the original abuse; for example, concerns
about bathing her children and hearing her husbands breathing during the night
and having flashbacks to her father’s abuse. The long term traumatic effects of
sexual abuse are well documented and well known. While I do not doubt that the
experience of having to recount the deatails of the abuse in front of her
father was traumatic, it stretches credulity to suggest that the long- term
effects of such a confrontation are worse than the original abuse.
[193] I accept the evidence of Dr.
Silver that by far the most significant factor contributing to the plaintiff’s
current difficulties is the sexual abuse by her father. I also accept his
opinion that the plaintiff’s fous on the Church as the source of her problems
is likely based on her need to displace her rage against her parents. It is
important to note the role of the plaintiff’s mother in all of this. The
plaintiff was cerainly betrayed by her father. However, her mother was
suspicious that her husbnd was abusing the plaintiff but said nothing. When the
plaintiff went to her about it she did intervene but the matter was hushed up
and Mrs. Palmer told her daughter not to tempt her father by dressing
provocatively or wearing pymamas in his presence. Mrs. Palmer was angry with
the plaintiff for bringing the matter up again in 1989 as she felt it was over
and done with. Later when the plaintiff left the Church there was further ill
will between mother and daughter and as the plaintiff poignantly stated in her
evidence “My mother died hating me”. Mrs. Palmer chose her allegiance to her
faith over her daughter. It is clear from all of the evidence that this
betrayal by her mother has also been a factor contributing to the plaintiffs
emotional difficulties.
[194] That said, I believe Dr.
Silver minimized the impact of the confrontation meeting. I accept the
evidenvce of Dr. Awad that this would have been re-traumatizing. I do not see
it as being as inconsequential as Dr. Silver described. I believe athe
confrontation meeting was extraordinarily difficult at the time and likely made
matters worse for the plaintiff for a period of time after that. However with
or without the December 29, 1989 meeting I believe the plaintiff would have
been in the same psychologically damaged state now. There were many factors
compounding the plaintiff’s inability to recover fully from the sexual abuse.
Those factors included the lack of support from her family, particularly her
mother, and the very sheltered judgmental environment in which she had been
raised. It is not easy for any person simply to break away from a religious
group that has been such a pervasive influence in all aspects of one’s life.
For a person with the vulnerabilities of the plaintifff and already damaged by
the sexual abuse that struggle was even more difficult. I recognize that to an
extent the difficulties the plaintiff now experiences are related to her
upbringing within the Jehovah’s Witness faith and the effects of leaving that
faith. However, those are not actionable sources of harm. The only cause of
action against the Church is in respect of its negligence in causing the
plaintiff’s attendance at the December 29, 1989 meeting. In my opinion that one
session, while traumatic, played only a minor role in creating the situation in
which the plaintiff now finds herself.
[195] At the time of the incident
giving rise to this cause of action, the plaintiff had already suffered the
initial harm from the sexual abuse and was alreadly suffering from its
sequelae. Her current emotional difficulties stemming from the sexual abuse
would have occurred in any event as would most of the other difficulties
arising from leaving the Church. In my opinion, this case falls within what has
been described as the “crumbling skull”: Athey v Leanati , [1996] 3
S.C.R. 458; W.R.B. v. Plint (2001) 93 B.C.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.S.C.) S.F.P.
v. Macdonald (1999) 234 A.R. 273 (Q.B.); Whitfield v Calhoun (1999)
242 A.R. 201 (Q.B.).
[196] Therefore, Watch Tower is not
liable in damages for the whole of the plaintiff’s current psychological
problems. Further, the plaintiff would have required psychological treatment
for the other sources of her difficulties in any event and I do not see the
sequelae of the December 29, 1989 meeting as requiring additional or more
prolonged treatment than would otherwise have been the case. There was,
however, psychological harm to the plaintiff as a result of the December 29,
1989 meeting. She was in a very vulnerable state at the time as she had just
begun to deal with the effects of her father’s abuse. I accept the evidence of
the various experts, including Dr. Awad, that this confrontation made things
worse for the plaintiff. I am not able to say in hindsight how long those
effects would have been felt. Putting a dollar figure on psychological harm is
always a nearly impossible task and one which is inherently arbirary. I am
mindful of the range of damges typically awarded to victims of severe childhood
incest and physical assault where the long term psychological harm is
significantly more disabling than in the plaintiff’s situation. Damages in those
most horrific cases range from $75,000.00 to $150,000.00. Taking all of those
factors into account I assess general damages suffered by the plaintiff in this
case at $5,000.00.
[197] There is no foundation on the
facts to support an award for punitive danages. Most of the allegations against
the defendants have not been established on the facts. The defendants who
interacted with the plaintiff did not bear ill will toward her. They accepted
the veracity of her account, were sympathetic to her situation and meant her no
harm. The claim for punitive damges is dismissed.
L. JUDGMENT AND COSTS
[198] In the result there will be judgement in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00 as against the defendant Watch Tower BiBle and Tract Society of Canada plus interest thereon at the Courts of Justice Act rate from August 28, 1998. The action is dismissed as against the other defendants. If the parties cannot agree on costs I can be spoken to.
Released June 26, 2003
Molloy J
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